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'RimPac 90' Military Exercise Assessed

HK2506144390 Beijing ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO
in Chinese 8 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Zheng Jing (6774 5464): "International Detente Does Not Affect Preparation for War; Military Exercises Conducted in the Pacific"]

[Text] The two-month big military exercise, code-named "RimPac 90" and jointly conducted by the United States, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia, came to an end recently.

Under an easing international situation, the United States and its allies conducted an exercise of such a scale in the Pacific and on small Pacific islands, and the background and purpose of the exercise is worth pondering.

The exercise is to show military might and to add strength to the "beyond containment" strategy of the Bush administration.

Some foreign newspapers commented on this, saying that the new "beyond containment" strategy proposed by the Bush administration last year was for strengthening peaceful penetration and launching a "soft attack" against socialist countries. However, the United States will never shelve its policy of using force as a backup.

The exercise began in early April and ended in late May. Over a period of nearly two months, the United States and its allies mobilized a total of more than 50,000 servicemen, more than 200 aircraft of various kinds, and over 50 ships. The exercise involved a majority of combat projects in contemporary regular warfare. The United States did this because it wanted to show its military might and strategic concept, which corresponds to Bush's "beyond containment" strategy.

In the West, since World War II the United States has acquired a comparatively stable status of master through NATO, observers pointed out. In the East, although the United States has formed alliances with some countries, the relations are comparatively loose. In particular, during the past two or three years, anti-U.S. sentiment among the peoples of Japan and South Korea has become strong, while in the Philippines there has been the crisis concerning the military bases, and all these have posed a threat to U.S. military and political forces in these areas.

However, alongside the approaching "era of the Pacific," the impact of the Pacific region on long-term U.S. interests has been increasing day by day. According to a recent statement by Paul B. Wolfowitz, U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, the U.S.' trade volume with the Asia-Pacific region accounts for 37 percent of its total trade volume with foreign countries, and is 50 percent more than the trade volume the United States has with Europe; the figure has surpassed that of Europe for 16 consecutive years.

According to reports, "RimPac 90," the joint large-scale military exercise conducted by the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and South Korea, was organized by the U.S. Pacific Headquarters, and directed by the commander of the U.S. Third Fleet. Observers held that the purpose of the United States in doing this was that it wanted to "strengthen relations with allies" and create in the Asia-Pacific region "a force resembling NATO," preparing the United States for safeguarding its interests in the Asia-Pacific region and further influencing affairs in the region in the future.

What is worth mentioning is that the participation of the South Korean Navy in "RimPac 90" was the first time South Korean forces had conducted a joint exercise with foreign forces other than U.S. forces, thereby breaking through the "restricted area" restricting military cooperation between South Korea and Japan because of past hatred. This action indicated a new development of the military alliance among the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Another actual purpose of the exercise was to test and improve the ability of U.S. forces in long-distance reinforcement and quick response.

Early this year, a joint team of the U.S. National Security Council, the State Department, and the Defense Department drafted a secret report entitled "Proposals for East Asia Strategy." The report held that with rapid changes taking place in Europe, Asia's situation had also greatly changed. From the viewpoint of military strategy, the most conspicuous change in the Asia region is that the Soviet Union has reduced its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and has withdrawn troops from Mongolia and Vietnam, and that the possibility of a large-scale confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region has further diminished.

Based on this situation, in order to realize President Bush's promise to reduce military expenditure in the new fiscal year and to ease the pressure within the country demanding a reduction in military expenditure and the number of troops stationed overseas, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney announced in February, during his visit to Japan and South Korea, that in the next three years the United States will reduce its forces stationed in East Asia and Southeast Asia by 10-12 percent.

According to the plan for closing 14 overseas military bases announced by the United States on 29 January, U.S. forces will also close the three Air Force bases in South Korea's Kwangju, Suwon, and Taegu, as well as the naval communications station in San Miguel in the Philippines.

International strategists hold that under the new situation of the United States adjusting its military strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, and when U.S. forces are being reduced in the region step by step in order to deal with a possible crisis or small-scale war that might

jeopardize U.S. interests in the region, it is an important task for U.S. forces to work hard to improve long-distance reinforcement and quick-response ability, for the time being and in the future as well.

Therefore, during the exercise, U.S. forces attached particular importance to drilling and improving the quick and long-distance reinforcement ability among strategic air forces, combat brigades on aircraft carriers, and Marines.

Future of Warsaw Pact Discussed

HK2706123990 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 25, 18 Jun 90 p 23

[Article by Sun Zhanlin (1327 0594 2651): "An Important Meeting That Has a Bearing on the Future of the Warsaw Treaty Organization"]

[Text] The Warsaw Treaty Organization's highest decision-making organ—the Political Consultative Committee—convened a meeting in Moscow on 7 June. The meeting was attended by the heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, and defense ministers of the seven Warsaw Pact countries, namely, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Democratic Germany, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. It was underlined in a post-meeting declaration that participants in the meeting "deem it necessary to re-examine the character and functions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization." This indicates that "substantive changes" will take place in the character, functions, and activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The meeting announced that a "government plenipotentiary committee" has been set up to prepare concrete proposals in this respect before October, to be submitted for discussion at an extraordinary meeting of the Political Consultative Committee to be convened before the end of November.

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization usually meets once a year. Since the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1954, delegations of the various countries who attend the committee's meetings have always been led by top leaders of the communist parties. This meeting was the first since the drastic changes in the East European political situation, from which new heads of state and new government leaders have emerged. Therefore, it was a particularly conspicuous meeting.

Topics discussed in the meeting mainly included the outlook of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, European security, and the unification of Germany.

The Warsaw Treaty was a product of the cold war after World War II. In the mid-1980's, new Soviet leader Gorbachev put forward the "new thinking." He started to make comprehensive adjustments in the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies, and he also established a defense strategy that was based on the principle of "reason and adequacy." At the same time, the Soviet Union actively sought political dialogue with

other countries, and progress was continuously made in U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations. Against the backdrop of the warming in East-West relations, the Soviet Union announced its unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops within a period of two years, indicated its willingness to consider military withdrawal from East Europe, and put forward a major proposal to Western countries—including the United States—on the simultaneous dissolution of the two big military blocs of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the early 21st century. During the transitional period of the dissolution of the two big military blocs, the Warsaw Pact and NATO should change from military-political organizations to political-military organizations.

However, the recent internal changes in Warsaw Pact countries have greatly weakened the standing and influence of the organization. The era of that organization being "an iron slab" and subservient to the Soviet Union has passed. Hungary and Czechoslovakia took the lead in asking the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from those two countries as quickly as possible. After repeated discussions, the Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw all of its tens of thousands of troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by 30 June 1991. Moreover, the Kremlin is also starting to reduce Soviet troops garrisoned in Poland and Democratic Germany.

The dissenting inclinations of some member countries have caused the Warsaw Pact to suffer a serious organizational crisis. Recently, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall said that the Warsaw Treaty Organization was obsolete, that Hungarian forces would not participate in the Warsaw Pact's joint military exercises anymore, and that it was hoped Hungary would be able to withdraw its membership from the Warsaw Pact later next year. According to what the defense minister of Democratic Germany revealed on 9 June, all Warsaw military units, including the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, would be dissolved by the end of this year. At the same time, the voices of six East European nations demanding equal standing with the Soviet Union and "sovereignty" are growing louder and louder. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have announced that their state councils' approval will be required when it comes to using their armed forces in foreign countries. Polish government officials said that the relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union is no longer of a "satellite-nation nature," and that such a relationship should be one of "partnership and good-neighborliness." However, the Soviet Union declared that while military confrontation still existed, the Warsaw Pact was still an important factor in the peace and stability of Europe.

In view of the current situation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, quite a number of analysts believe that the Warsaw Pact has "ceased to exist except in name," and that it is on the verge of "collapse." Therefore, the ways in which the nature of the Warsaw Pact can be re-determined and the changing of its functions became the central topic of discussion at the meeting.

The basic direction and the outline of the transformation of the Warsaw Pact were delineated in the declaration issued after the meeting. The declaration said: "Participating nations are of the unanimous opinion that the enemy image on the ideological front has been eliminated to a large extent by efforts on the part of the East and the West, and Eastern and Western concepts have re-acquired a pure theoretical significance." The Warsaw Pact's "urgent task" is to "establish an all-European new security setup, and a united Europe that exists in peace and cooperation." The internal relations of Warsaw Pact member nations "should be established on a basis of democratic principles," and these countries should have sovereignty and be on an equal standing. The declaration stressed that participating nations were willing to reinforce their cooperation with NATO and its members "on a bilateral and multilateral basis." Speaking to journalists after the meeting, Soviet officials stressed that no country had asked to withdraw its membership from the Warsaw Treaty Organization during the meeting. At the same time, the Soviet government news agency TASS quoted Soviet Foreign Ministry personalities as saying that the Warsaw Pact would "highlight political and consultative aspects and amend certain obsolete structures."

Another of the meeting's important topics of discussion was the military and political status of a reunified Germany. The principle confirmed in the meeting is that the reunification of Germany should be realized in the process of the development of one Europe, and the security of the legitimate interests of Germany's neighbors and other nations should be taken into consideration, and that European borders should not be infringed upon.

On the unification of Germany, the Soviet standpoint is acutely antagonistic to that of NATO countries like the United States. While the former advocates military neutrality for reunified Germany, the latter insists that reunified Germany should become a NATO member. It is worthwhile to point out that Democratic Germany, being one of the countries concerned, has adopted a standpoint closer to that of the West. Poland has stated its objection to the neutralization of Germany. Although other Warsaw Pact nations have not clearly indicated how they feel, their standpoints are not wholly identical to that of the Soviet Union.

First Warship Built For Thai Navy Launched

*OW2906055590 Shanghai City Service in Mandarin
2200 GMT 25 Jun 90*

[Text] A 053HT-model guided missile escort vessel, the first ever built by the Hudong Shipyard for the Thai Navy, was ceremoniously launched at the shipyard on 24 June according to Thai custom. The vessel is a new model of warship, designed and constructed by the Hudong Shipyard independently and successfully, with the support from the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Navy.

This warship is equipped with advanced electronic weapons and equipment, including guided missiles, automatic gunnery, antisubmarine missiles, electronic warfare control, and an information system. The engine room requires no human operation. Equipped with modern remote-control monitoring, it is capable of convoy and escort work, fishery protection, surveillance, supporting landing operations and land battles in coastal and ocean waters, and carrying out other military tasks. It also has both offensive and defensive capabilities.

Following the standards of the Chinese Navy, the Hudong Shipyard has tried its best to improve the quality of design and construction of the vessel. The most advanced technology was employed in the process of construction, ensuring the quality of the vessel.

Those attending yesterday's launching ceremony included Admiral Praphat Kritsinachan, commander in chief of the Royal Thai Navy; Zhang Shou, general manager of the All-China Shipping Industrial Corporation; Vice Admiral Nie Kuiju, commander of the East China Sea Fleet; Rear Admiral (Shi Tianding), deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army's Navy; and Gu Chuanxun, vice mayor of Shanghai Municipality.

Shanghai Launches Missile Ship for Thailand

*OW0107112390 Shanghai WEN HUI BAO in Chinese
26 Jun 90 p 1*

[By reporter Qian Weihua (6929 4580 5478) and correspondent Zhang Dacheng (1728 1129 2052)]

[Text] A grand ceremony to launch the latest-designed guided missile escort vessel, built and contracted for exportation to Thailand, was held in Shanghai yesterday [25 June].

Equipped with dozens of advanced facilities, including guided missiles, automatic artillery, antisubmarine missiles, electronic combat information system, and modern remote-control telemeters, the unmanned escort vessel was successfully built by Hudong Shipyard in accordance with a design developed by the Chinese Navy. The vessel has reached the international standard.

Among those who attended the launching ceremony were Thai Navy Commander General Praphat Kritsinachan, China Ship Building Industrial Corporation General Manager Zhang Shou, Vice Mayor Gu Chuanxun, East Sea Fleet Commander Lieutenant General Nie Kuiju, and Navy Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Shi Tianding.

Chinese, Soviets Discuss Troops, Arms Withdrawal

*HK2706100090 Hong Kong AFP in English 0844 GMT
27 Jun 90*

[Text] Beijing, June 27 (AFP)—Soviet and Chinese officials have met here to discuss the number of troops

and arms to be withdrawn from their border, a spokesman for the Soviet Embassy here said Wednesday [27 June].

Diplomats and military leaders from the two countries met here and in the eastern Chinese city of Dalian from June 15 to June 26, the spokesman said, adding that they discussed ways of strengthening mutual confidence.

The two sides have decided to meet again in Moscow in the fall at the level of vice foreign minister, the spokesman said.

He said the delegations were led by Liu Guangzhi, deputy director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's department of Soviet Union and East European affairs, and G.V. Kireev, director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's department in charge of socialist Asian countries.

During their stay, the Soviet experts met several times with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei and defense ministry officials, the official NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY said in a brief dispatch.

The border talks were the last of a series here and in Moscow and came after Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a demilitarization of the border during a historic summit meeting here in May 1989.

UN Representative on Peace Zone in Indian Ocean

OW0607053190 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0145 GMT 4 Jul 90

[By reporter Lei Lili]

[Text] United Nations, 3 June (XINHUA)—Sha Zukang, Chinese representative attending the 369th meeting of the United Nations special committee on the Indian Ocean, pointed out today that the activities and presence of certain external big powers in the Indian Ocean have affected the peace and security of the region; therefore, eliminating the military activities and presence of these big powers is the key to establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Sha Zukang said: The main reason why peace and security in the Indian Ocean cannot be ensured and why the objective of establishing a peace zone in the Indian Ocean still cannot be achieved is because certain external big powers are unwilling to forsake their military expansion in the Indian Ocean. He said: The international community should urge these big powers to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the countries in the Indian Ocean; not to threaten, subvert, or invade them nor to interfere in their affairs by any means; stop all their military activities in the region; and dismantle all their military bases and facilities.

The Chinese representative said: Peace in the Indian Ocean also depends on the efforts of the countries in the region. This means that they should strictly abide by the

UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; they should not seek to arm beyond their defense needs; and they should not use force or threaten to use force against other countries in the region. In particular, he pointed out that countries in the region possessing nuclear weapons should commit themselves not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons in the region.

XINHUA Analysis of NATO Declaration, Policy

OW0807091190 Beijing XINHUA in English 0809 GMT 8 Jul 90

[By Fu Quansheng and Wang Shengliang: "News Analysis: Readjustment of NATO Strategy"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] London, July 7 (XINHUA)—The North Atlantic alliance (NATO) has finally offered the Warsaw Pact a declaration, saying they are "no longer adversaries" and the cold war which has lingered over more than four decades between the two military blocs becomes what NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner called "history."

The declaration was welcomed by the Soviet Union. President Mikhail Gorbachev called it "a first step in right direction."

U.S. President George Bush, who brought a blueprint for a transformed NATO strategy, was exuberant to call the London summit, which wound up Friday, a "turning point" and said it will make the Soviet Union no longer regard NATO as a threat to it.

But a question would derive from all these expressions and remarks: What is the justification for the continued existence of NATO after all?

There was no answer from any NATO leaders except Mrs Thatcher, who claimed at the summit that the Soviet military might was still "formidable" and NATO had to be "one of resolve in defence".

It was, to some extent, to her insistence that the declaration included some traditional NATO terms like "there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted" and NATO should "maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, kept up-to-date."

In fact the declaration also said that "no one would be certain of the future," implying uncertainty of the West about the track for the Soviet transition, hence the need for continued pressure.

Thatcher also indicated early this year that there exists instability outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East, which would be a threat to the Western interests, even when confrontations in Central Europe has dwindled. That means the West is likely to play the role of "world gendarme" as in the old days.

NATO leaders, however, have agreed to make fundamental changes in alliance's military strategic doctrine to "match time" after the drastic changes in Eastern Europe.

Nuclear weapons to be used as "last resort" was written into the declaration, a shift away from long-standing "flexible response" policy.

"Forward defence" philosophy was replaced by a phrase of "reduced forward presence" and force structure will be also undergoing a thorough review, changing to smaller and more active forces.

Observers here said NATO was abandoning its traditional defence strategy, known as the "layer cake" formation of troops in favour of the less expensive "currant bun" system.

The theory of the "layer cake" is that NATO's individual armies—American, British as well as force from other NATO countries—guard their own sectors of West Germany, which reflected post-war division of Germany, to encounter large-scale attacks from the Warsaw Pact.

In view of the current changes in Eastern Europe and claims it faces "threat", the increasingly self-confident Germans become intolerable to the arrangement.

So NATO planners have been preparing plans to switch to the so-called "currant bun" system.

The system contains smaller, but highly-mobile multinational units positioned around West Germany, under which, they argued, a potential aggressor would not know where the NATO troops were.

The disappearance of the once clear confrontation line between the two military blocs after German unification is the main consideration for NATO to make reforms in its strategy.

There are other considerations for these changes as well: First, West European opinion is demanding a "peace dividend" by virtue of cuts in defence expenditure as the bi-polar is becoming less antagonistic. Secondly, the Americans simply can no longer afford to keep 300,000 troops, stationed in West Germany.

The transformed strategy reflected wishes of both President Bush and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who are, according to Britain's newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES, deciding "a shape of the new Europe".

NORTH KOREA**U.S. Won't Halt 'Chemical Weapons' Production***SK1007052790 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0430 GMT 10 Jul 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, July 10 (KCNA)—The U.S. Defense Department is now reportedly forcing the Occidental Corp. in Dallas and the Mobey Corp. in Pittsburg to produce thionyl chloride needed for poison gas shells. The department is even examining "legal measures" to encourage the production and sales of raw materials for chemical weapons, a report says.

MINJU CHOSON today brands this as a criminal act going against the trend toward disarmament and detente and a high-handed challenge to the world's peace-loving people who demand the abolition of nuclear and chemical weapons.

The news analyst says:

The U.S. imperialists' scheme to continuously produce chemical weapons of mass destruction the use of which is strictly banned by international accords brings into relief their ulterior intention to unleash another war and use the chemical weapons, come what may.

An international conference for the ban on chemical weapons was held in Paris in January last year, which ended with the adoption of a final declaration. At the recent Soviet-U.S. summit talks, it was agreed to discontinue the production of binary chemical weapons and reduce the ones in stock. In wanton violation of the agreement, the U.S. imperialists refuse to stop the production of chemical weapons.

They not only introduced chemical weapons of different types in South Korea but also built a poison gas factory and produce chemical weapons there and stage joint chemical warfare exercises with the South Korean puppets during the annual "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers.

All facts show that the U.S. imperialists are fanatics of chemical warfare menacing world peace and security and heinous criminals crudely violating international law.

The U.S. imperialists must stop the criminal acts of increasing the nuclear and chemical weapons behind the facade of peace.

SOUTH KOREA**Government Creating Agency for North-South Arms Issues***SK3006013190 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
30 Jun 90 p 2*

[Text] Senior officials of the administration and the ruling party yesterday agreed to establish a government agency in charge of handling inter-Korean arms cuts and related issues.

They were determined to have the projected office coordinate the opinions and interests of relevant government agencies with regard to arms and tension reductions on the Korean peninsula, an official present at their meeting said.

Arms control issues have so far been dealt with by an informal panel led by Yim Tong-won, dean of the state-run Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, under the wing of the Prime Minister's Office.

The participants, however, reaffirmed the long-standing government position that confidence-building measures should be tried before concrete steps for arms control are taken between South and North Korea which fought a bitter war four decades ago.

Once a basis of mutual confidence has been established, both sides can undertake steps for arms control and arms curtailment as outlined in the three-phased South Korean formula.

"We hope that military issues between South and North Korea will be construed as a question of arms control in one nation, rather than the concept of arms cuts which prevails in U.S.-Soviet relations.

"As they are directly linked to reunification issues, all of these issues should be handled by an ad hoc body composed of pertinent agencies," Yim said.

The participants further shared the view that the private sector should use a sole channel for economic negotiations with socialist countries in a bid to prevent hectic competition and enhance negotiating power under the guidance of government authorities.

They decided to give positive consideration to the setting up of a comprehensive organization comprising government officials and businessmen to handle matters concerning economic cooperation and trade with socialist countries.

The Federation of Korean Industries, an interest group composed of large business firms, and the International Private Economic Council of Korea, have attempted to control Korean enterprises' contacts with their socialist partners but their efforts have not been fully successful, they pointed out.

Concerns Mount Over North's Refusal To Sign Safeguards Agreement*SK0307040090 Seoul YONHAP in English 0321 GMT
3 Jul 90*

[Text] Seoul, July 3 (YONHAP)—North Korea may try to develop nuclear weapons in a bid to get the upper hand over South Korea in arms control talks, the National Unification Board said Tuesday. In a report to the National Assembly, the board said the government would increase its pressure on North Korea, trying to get it to sign the safeguards agreement of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under which subscriber countries should open their nuclear facilities to outside inspection.

While doing its best to prevent the North acquiring a nuclear strike capability, the government will take "measures for national survival" in the event that it fails, the board said. Concern about North Korea's development of nuclear arms is mounting as the Communist North has refused to sign the agreement while building what are believed to be nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities in Yongpyon North of Pyongyang, the board said. According to the board, the U.S. and Soviet Foreign Ministers expressed concern about North Korea's development of nuclear devices in a joint communique issued in February.

On June 22, South Korean Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said North Korea was likely to be able to manufacture nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s and that the nuclear reprocessing facilities in Yongpyon were expected to be completed this year. His remarks to the National Assembly Defense Committee contradicted wire services reports that the North would be able to produce nuclear weapons within six months. Earlier last month, Science and Technology Minister Chong Kun-mo, quoting IAEA Director-General Hans Blix, said Pyongyang was likely to sign the safeguards agreement by September.

Pyongyang was likely to send negotiators to Vienna around July 10 to sign the accord, Chong said. North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 1985 but has not signed the agreement, to which subscribers are required to put their names within 18 months of signing the treaty.

North Reportedly Spent Billions on Imported Arms

SK0307031290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0313 GMT
3 Jul 90

[Text] Seoul, July 3 (YONHAP)—North Korea spent 4.044 billion U.S. dollars on arms imports between 1986 and 1988 and sold 255 million dollars worth of weapons to Third-World nations, a report to the National Assembly by the National Unification Board revealed Tuesday. Quoting statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the report said North Korea spent 1.088 billion dollars to import weapons in 1986, 787 million dollars in 1987 and 2.169 billion dollars in 1988.

The unification board estimated that purchases from the Soviet Union in the 1980s under military assistance programs included 30 MIG-29 fighters, 18 SU-25 fighters and 24 SAM-5 mobile surface to air missile systems. Soviet weapons shipped to North Korea in the 10-year period also included 11 SSN-2 ship to ship missiles, 240 AA-7 air-to-air missiles, 720 AA-8 air-to-air missiles, 234 surface-to-air missiles, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, 120 SSN-2 ship-to-ship missiles, and 240

SS-1B surface-to-surface missiles, the report said. North Korea built 62 BMP-MICV tanks and 542 T-62 tanks with technical assistance from the Soviet Union in the cited period, according to the report.

Measures Against DPRK Nuclear Potential Viewed

SK0407005290 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
4 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] North Korea is likely to develop nuclear weapons in a bid to gain the upper hand over South Korea in possible arms control talks, the National Unification Board said yesterday.

Reporting to the National Assembly on the possibility of North Korea's possession of nuclear arms, the board said that the government "is watching closely moves in the North on nuke development in cooperation with our allies, such as the United States."

The board also said that the government would seek to increase pressure on Pyongyang to sign the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA agreement stipulates that subscriber countries should open their nuclear facilities to outside inspection.

While seeking to prevent North Korea from acquiring a nuclear strike capability, the government will take measures for national survival, in case its efforts fail, according to the board.

The North has refused to sign the agreement, while building what are believed to be nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon north of Pyongyang.

Wire services reported last month that the North would be able produce nuclear arms within six months.

The board also reported to the Assembly that North Korea spent \$4 billion on arms imports between 1986 and 1988, and sold \$255 million worth of weapons to third-world nations.

Quoting statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the board estimated that weapons the North imported from the Soviet Union in the 1980s included 30 MIG-29 fighters and 24 Sam-5 mobile surface to air missile systems.

Arms Control Panel Sought for Disarmament Talks

SK0607055290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0522 GMT
6 Jul 90

[Text] Seoul, July 6 (OANA-YONHAP)—An arms control coordinating committee under the direct control of President No Tae-u will be set up in preparation for disarmament negotiations with North Korea, a government source said Friday.

The government is drafting a proposal on arms control while reviewing, on a forward-looking basis, Pyongyang's recent proposal for four-stage disarmament on the Korean peninsula, the source said. The arms committee will handle arms control and unification issues as well as the matter of U.S. forces in Korea. It will be manned by high-ranking officials from the Defense and Foreign Ministries, the National Unification Board and other government agencies and will likely be headed by Yim Tong-won, director of the Foreign Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. Yim currently heads a working-level task force on national security policy under the Prime Minister's Office.

The committee is required because arms control will surface as a major topic in talks between the prime ministers of the two Koreas (the first meeting is expected in August or September in Seoul and the second round in October in Pyongyang) and in a joint military committee that will probably be established as an affiliated working-level body to the talks, the source said. The government sees the high-level encounters as a decisive turning point for lowering tension on the Korean peninsula and improving inter-Korean relations, said the source, who declined to be identified. The government, considering that arms control will be sought in linkage with restructuring the U.S. troop presence in Korea, will closely consult Washington on a gradual reduction of U.S. troops, according to the source. Comparing the North and South Korean proposals on arms control, the source cautiously assessed the positions taken by the two Koreas as having similarities.

"Our basic position is that we would positively review any North Korean disarmament proposal, whatever it may be, from the viewpoint of easing tension on the Korean peninsula," he said. The South's draft proposal calls for three-stage disarmament—building military confidence between the two Koreas, followed by arms control and reduction of forces. Suggested measures to build military confidence are the exchange of military intelligence and maintaining military communications, allowing access to major military activities, taking steps to prevent a surprise strike or armed conflict, signing a declaration of non-use of military might and non-aggression, stepping up surveillance and verification activities and forming an international watchdog body.

The South would also consider a substantial reduction of U.S. troops, scaling down the "Team Spirit" Korea-U.S. joint military exercise and making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone if the North deployed rearward the 90 brigades it has posted near the military demarcation line dividing the peninsula, and if it signed the nuclear safeguard accord of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the source said. The government, setting aside its principle that confidence building must precede troop reduction, is willing to positively consider any proposal for a troop reduction to come first.

Seoul will also propose each side maintain a standing army equivalent to 1 percent of its population in preparation for reunification, the source said. The North made a four-point disarmament proposal May 31 that featured building confidence, arms reduction, withdrawal of foreign troops and disarmament and a guarantee of peace.

"It is unclear if the North's proposal means four-stage disarmament in the sequence listed, but we see it as similar to our three-stage disarmament proposal—confidence building, arms control and troop reductions," the source said.

DPRK Said Planning To Sign Nuclear Accord

*SK0807070590 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
8 Jul 90 p 1*

[Report by correspondent Chong Yon-chu from San Francisco]

[Text] It seems North Korea will sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] nuclear safeguards agreement in September. On 6 July, a North Korean representative participating in a seminar on arms control on the Korean peninsula, which was hosted by the International Security Institute for Disarmament at Stanford University in the United States, made this disclosure to another seminar participant. It was revealed that when the participant asked the North Korean representative when North Korea planned to sign to the nuclear safeguards agreement, the North Korean said North Korea would sign the agreement this fall.

North Korea had already revealed it was going to dispatch a representative to the IAEA in late August. It seems North Korea plans to sign to the nuclear safeguards agreement in early September, when the general meeting of the IAEA takes place.

In the past, the U.S. State Department has said North Korea's signing of the nuclear safeguards agreement will remain an important issue in improving relations between the two countries. It seems if North Korea does sign this agreement, the relations between the two countries will greatly improve.

Writer Analyzes Stanford Arms Reduction Seminar

*SK1007112490 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
8 Jul 90 p 4*

[Article by correspondent Kim Chang-ki from San Francisco]

[Text] A "meeting on peace and security on the Korean peninsula" has taken place at Stanford University in San Francisco, in the United States. This meeting was of great significance, because even though the U.S. side organized it, virtually for the first time, North and South Korean experts met with each other and extensively

discussed arms reduction on the Korean peninsula. Even though it was an academic seminar, people from the "three parties"—North and South Korea and the United States—sat together for the first time.

In my opinion, first, on the nature of this meeting and what was discussed during this meeting, North and South Korea merely reiterated what they had respectively discussed and asserted at home, and nothing more was accomplished at this meeting. In other words, the two sides reaffirmed their respective opinions.

Also, even though this was a "tripartite academic seminar," the fact the U.S. Administration and our government have refused to accept the "tripartite talks," which North Korea has demanded to solve the Korean peninsula problem, has not changed.

This meeting took place behind closed doors for three days. Reporters were not allowed to enter the meeting place. In the first place, this was merely a meeting among "civilian-level scholars"; they did not speak on behalf of their respective governments (of course, the North Korean scholars can be said to have been an exception); and this was not at all a negotiation between persons in authority.

However, the significance of this meeting cannot be underestimated. This is because it took place to discuss arms reduction on the Korean peninsula for the first time, when big progress has been made in arms reduction between the East and West and in reforms in the Soviet Union and East Europe. This is also because what North and South Korea discussed during this meeting will serve as an impetus for their discussion on and development of this issue.

On the U.S. side, James Goodby, a Carnegie-Mellon University professor and former U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Arms Reduction Talks, and William Perry, a Stanford University professor and former under secretary of defense, respectively spoke on how to apply the experiences from arms reduction in Europe to the Korean peninsula and how to achieve arms control on the Korean peninsula.

What they said is roughly in the same vein as what Professor Chong Chong-uk, director of the Institute of International Affairs of Seoul National University [SNU]; SNU Prof. Ha Yong-son; Yonsei University Prof. An Pyong-chun; Korea University Prof. Han Sung-chu, and other participants on our side asserted.

Choe U-chin, deputy director of the Institute of Research for Peace and Arms Control, was originally scheduled to attend this meeting as head of the North Korean delegation but could not because of the 3 July North-South talks. Instead, three people of this institute, including Yi Hyong-chol, director of this institute's Research Department, attended the meeting. They reiterated the arms reduction proposal that North Korea advanced on 31 May.

Also, on the U.S. side, Spencer Richardson, chief of the Korea Desk at the Department of State, and other people, and, on our side, two officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense attended the meeting as observers.

The focus of discussion at this meeting was, of course, which of the two must come first—confidence building or arms reduction. The North Korean side reiterated its previous assertion that no genuine confidence can be built unless arms are first reduced. An interesting fact on this issue is that, for the first time, in advancing an arms reduction proposal, North Korea referred to the "plan to build military confidence," which was not mentioned by the all-inclusive peace proposal in November 1988. Also, in the May proposal, North Korea listed the "plan to build military confidence" ahead of the "plan for arms reduction." Regarding the question of whether or not this means that it is possible for North Korea to accept the proposal for building confidence first, the North Korean participants gave a negative response.

However, it is not because one is burdened with excessive military expenditures that one tends to distrust one's opposing side and to consider it as an antagonistic group that threatens one's security. It is clear that because mistrust and enmity exist, excessive military expenditures are incurred. Moreover, experiences from arms reduction in Europe provide a good lesson on how important it is to first build confidence.

That is, as the South Korean and U.S. participants pointed out at this meeting, genuine progress was made in arms reduction in Europe after political confidence was built through the 1975 inauguration of the CSCE and the Helsinki Agreement and after military confidence was built in ways, as stipulated by the 1986 Stockholm Agreement, [for the East and West] to remove dubious aspects in handling military affairs by notifying each other of major exercises in advance and by letting each other observe these exercises.

During this meeting, as a practical measure for arms control, the North Korean side mainly focused on the reduction of both sides' troops, and our side stressed comprehensive arms control in which each of the two sides not only must scale down the troops and weapons, but also reform or scale down its military structure, which may threaten the opposing side.

Our side was of the opinion that the model of arms reduction in Europe can be applied on the Korean peninsula, and the North Korean side adhered to the declaratory slogan of "Europe and the Korean peninsula are different." In this way, the North Korean side turned a blind eye to the question of whether it is sensible and feasible to reduce the armed forces. This again shows that the North Korean side advanced the arms reduction proposal not with sincerity but for political propaganda purposes.

North, South To Jointly Study Disarmament*SK1107011590 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 11 Jul 90 p 1*

[Text] Middle-level diplomats of south and north Korea will together attend the U.N. Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services Program which is sponsored by the U.N. Department for Disarmament for four months from July 23.

According to a Foreign Ministry official, it is the first time that south and north Korea, both with observer status at the United Nations, were invited to the program which the United Nations has offered for officials from 25 member countries since 1978.

The Seoul diplomat who will participate in the program is Kim Myong-chin who recently returned from his studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of John's Hopkins University in Washington [place as published]. The north Korean was identified as Yi Yong-ho, an official of the north Korean Foreign Ministry.

The participants in the program, from 27 countries including south and north Korea, will stay in Geneva for two months and observe the ongoing special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament.

They will also tour the Soviet Union, Austria, Finland, West Germany, Japan and Sweden to inspect disarmament conditions there.

The four-month program will end around late November at the United Nations where the officials are to observe sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.

TAIWAN**New Dry Dock To Facilitate Warship Construction***OW0207043990 Taipei CNA in English 0248 GMT
2 Jul 90*

[Text] Kaohsiung, Southern Taiwan, July 2 (CNA)—China Shipbuilding Corp. launched the construction of a 100,000-ton dry dock Sunday to facilitate the building of warships ordered by the Republic of China Navy, a spokesman said Sunday.

Construction of the dock, estimated to cost one billion new Taiwan dollars (about 36 million U.S. dollars), was expected to be completed in two years, the spokesman said.

The state-owned shipbuilder has been contracted by the Navy to build a fleet of Parry-class guided missile frigates, which is a major part of the country's plan to renew naval force with a second generation of warships.

The new dock would be the site to assemble the country's first locally produced frigates, the spokesman said. In addition to the dock, China Shipbuilding had built additional small docks and a weapons systems assembly plant to meet the needs.

Since the world shipbuilding industry had gradually recovered from years of depression, the dock could also be used for ship repairing when it was available, the spokesman said.

This was expected to bring the debt-plagued shipbuilder at least 500 million new Taiwan dollars in business revenues, he predicted.

THAILAND**Suchinda Refuses To Allow Examination of Arms***BK0207020190 Bangkok THE NATION in English
2 Jul 90 p 3*

[By Thawisak Sipphan]

[Excerpt] The Army will not allow the Office of the Auditor-General of Thailand to examine arms supplies procured at a "friendship price" from China, army chief Gen [General] Suchinda Khrapayun said yesterday. Suchinda was confirming reports that the Defence Minister will propose on Tuesday [3 July] that the Cabinet allow the arms shipment, which is expected to arrive soon, to be exempted from scrutiny by the auditor-general's office for "security reasons."

The proposal drew prompt protest from the office, which reportedly said it was against normal practice and that the government could end up with out-of-date weaponry if the shipment was not scrutinized according to regulations. The auditing office said in recent investigations it had found that some ammunition bought from China was no longer truly effective because it had passed its expiration date. The army, however, argued that the ammunition was bought at a low price for use in training.

The office argued that it had a right to review the new arms shipment as it had been purchased out of the government budget's central fund. But Suchinda said yesterday the Chinese arms were purchased out of a military "secret fund" so the office had nothing to do with the procurement. He said procurement was also made on a government-to-government basis so the office should not be worried that Beijing would supply out-of-date or expired arms to Thailand.

He admitted that some of the shipment was used supplies but added that the army was fully aware of this before it made the purchase. He said the army could not disclose details of the arms procurement even to the auditing office because it concerned national security.

Military sources said that Beijing did not want news of the arms shipment to be released for fear that it would affect its relations with some of its allies. [passage omitted]

BULGARIA

Unilateral Cut in Naval Forces Implemented

AU0607130390 Sofia BTA in English
1125 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, 6 July (BTA)—In compliance with last year's decision of the Bulgarian Government for the unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces and of the Navy in particular, two patrol-ships designed for chasing submarines have been disarmed, today's ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME announces. These ships are now in Varna Lake and they will be either smelted or sold.

Two high-speed cutters will have the same fate. The disarmament of a submarine of 1,700 tons displacement, 76 m long and 6.70 m wide, will begin after July 20 this year. In this case it will not be converted but destroyed.

Referring to information received from Admiral Vasil Yanakiev, commander of the Bulgarian Navy, the paper announces that the disarmament of the five naval units will be completed by October 1, 1990.

It is noted in the feature that Bulgaria is the first in the world to start disarming its navy.

In September this year the country will be visited by foreign experts, participants in a seminar held under the auspices of the United Nations. They will see the disarmed military units and will have meetings with the navy leadership.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ministry Official on Armaments Industry Conversion

AU2706151990 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 20 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Richard Stregl article: "Which Weapons Should Be Scrapped?"]

[Text] The word "conversion," which was almost unknown before, has already become firmly rooted in our language. Almost everyone knows the problems that enterprises have to face during the transition to civilian production, how many people will have to be retrained, and that the last tank will be produced soon. Much less—in fact almost nothing—is being said about arms production, which has not been reduced and which will probably not be reduced. For more information, we visited Eng. Ladislav Nemec, director of the administration of special technology, at the Ministry of Metallurgy, Engineering, and the Electrotechnical Industry.

Production of the so-called special technology, to which belong infantry arms and ammunition, communications equipment, radio locators, training systems for aviation technology, and some types of artillery technology, still

continues. The situation in pertinent enterprises, such as Ceska Zbrojovka, Uhersky Brod, Sellier Bellot, Vlasim, General Engineering Plants Dubnica, Konstrukta, Trenčin, Tesla, Pardubice, Aero, Vodochody, etc., is unenviable. Compared to the enterprises which are undergoing conversion and where the people know their situation, the aforementioned enterprises remain in uncertainty. Will their production be reduced, will they stagnate, or will they develop? They do not know. The answer depends mostly on the results of the Vienna talks and on the new Czechoslovak defense doctrine. Nothing has been decided upon yet. The amount—designated by the state—for the purchase of technology and the possibilities for foreign sales will be of no less importance.

The exports of our arms are, or at least were, surrounded by mystery and rumors, but they were undoubtedly profitable. This pertains to exports to the Soviet Union as well as to the Third World. Why could we not export more tanks and armored vehicles for infantry [BVP] and thus improve a little the situation in the enterprises and also in the state coffers? Simply because the demand for arms is declining throughout the world. If the orders for tanks in 1988 represented 100 percent, then this number would be 10 percent for 1991—or, according to some predictions, even far smaller. The interest in BVP's remains approximately the same. This is certainly an unequivocal answer to the opinions on why the CSFR should reduce its income from arms sales due to some moral principles.

Also, the idea that—in the relaxed international climate—we could manage to penetrate into new markets is naive. The technological level of the tanks produced, for example, by West German, French, or U.S. firms is much higher—as far as some parameters are concerned—than that of Soviet T-72's, irrespective of what the basic military soldiers used to be told. And, in view of the expensive production, we cannot cut the price too much.

According to L. Nemec, only some types of special technology have a chance to assert themselves. The system for training military pilots—L39—and the new L39 MS, which comprises an airplane, simulator, and diagnostic equipment have the greatest chances. In the interests of increasing our ability to compete, of increasing the technological level, and of widening the assortment, the federal government recommended, in one of its resolutions, that the enterprises begin to seek production partners abroad—even outside the CEMA countries.

One Czechoslovak weapon which is still sold—and probably will be sold for a long time—on all the continents is Brno's nine millimeter pistol type 75. Because of its reliability, this gun is very popular with all kinds of berets, contras, and counter-contras, who crawl through the jungles all over the world. Being shiny and silverish, inlaid with ivory, or with a butt made of quality wood, this gun is featured in most hand gun catalogues. This proves that quality goods do not need commercials.

Control Experiments for Verifying CW Ban

*LD0407204890 Prague CTK in English 1732 GMT
4 Jul 90*

[Text] Prague, July 4 (CTK)—Control experiments to verify the reliability of inspections on call were carried out in Czechoslovakia on July 3 and 4, within the framework of preparations for adopting a package of measures of a convention on a general and complete ban on chemical weapons.

The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry said in its statement today that the experiments were conducted in the East Bohemian chemical plant in Pardubice and at a Czechoslovak Army installation in East Bohemia. Experts from the ministries of defence, foreign affairs and the chemical industry confirmed that this form of control is feasible and effective.

The statement stressed that Czechoslovakia does not own or produce chemical weapons and has no such weapons on its territory.

Czechoslovakia will shortly inform of the results of the experiment other countries at the Geneva disarmament conference with the aim to contribute towards a speedy finalization of the provisions of the draft convention.

Update on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Progress

*AU0607133690 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
5 Jul 90 p 1*

[CTK report: "Withdrawal Continues"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory continues in accordance with the agreed timetables. A total of 29,045 Soviet soldiers and 13,573 family members left Czechoslovakia by 0600 on 4 July 1990. Furthermore, 567 tanks, 885 combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 476 guns and mortars, 197 anti-aircraft defense systems, 7,581 automobiles, 92 helicopters, 19 aircraft, and 30 launching pads were withdrawn. In order to fulfill the tasks of the second stage of withdrawal, which is to be completed by the end of this year, rail transport capacity has been increased by creating a new route through Poland. This made it possible to dispatch two to three complete trains a day from our territory in the month of June.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

State Secretary Proposes Army Limit at CSCE

*AU2806185790 Vienna Domestic Service in German
1600 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Roland Machatschke report]

[Text] The two German governments should issue a joint statement on the self-limitation of the future German armed forces. With this proposal GDR State Secretary

Marczinek surprised the delegates of that CSCE conference, at which NATO and Warsaw Pact discuss the reduction of nonnuclear arms.

He did not want to give any figures, but he said that the USSR proposal—an upper limit between 200,000 and 250,000 men—is unacceptable. According to suggestions by politicians and military experts from both German states, they can imagine a troop limit of 300,000 to 350,000 men as a realistic figure.

The following could be the schedule until the end of the year: Next week a NATO decision on expanding the mandate for the Vienna negotiations, where at the moment only the reduction of U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe is discussed; draft of a treaty on the renunciation of force between NATO and Warsaw Pact; and, by the CSCE summit in Paris in November, clear statements on the strength of the future all-German armed forces.

With this the West hopes to eliminate the USSR's reservations and also to abolish the—as GDR State Secretary Marczinek said, and I quote—historically founded security reservations of the neighbors of a united Germany, unquote.

Eppelmann Views Canceling Soviet Weapons Contracts

*LD2906145990 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1408 GMT 29 Jun 90*

[Text] Hamburg (ADN)—According to Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann, the GDR is threatened with a conventional fine of 250 million Deutsche marks for the cancellation of existing contracts on Soviet weapons deliveries. In an interview for BILD newspaper (Saturday edition) the minister reported that the GDR is currently negotiating with the Soviet Union with great success to get out of existing contracts. He described the expected conventional penalty as "favorable" as it stands.

All delivery contracts on new weapons, including the ordered 23 Soviet MiG-29 fighters, have been cancelled, said Eppelmann. Only two new ships, whose equipment has already been converted in such a way that they can only be used for coastal defense, have been received. "We are disarming in a serious and genuine way. We are steadily reducing our fighting power," the minister said.

'Secret' NVA Plan Reported

*AU0207124390 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
2 Jul 90 p 16*

[Unattributed report: "Eppelmann's Plans"]

[Text] Bonn and East Berlin are quarreling over the future strength of the GDR National People's Army (NVA). In agreement with Defense Minister Stoltenberg (Christian Democratic Union), FRG military experts

suggested that the NVA should only retain 50,000 soldiers (32 percent) and scrap all "major items of equipment, including tanks, artillery systems, and aircraft. The staff of the GDR "disarmament and defense" minister, Rainer Eppelmann, wants 100,000 men, as a secret document reveals. Their main task would, among other things, be to "ensure the military protection of GDR territory on all conditions." To achieve this, 35 launch pads for tactical missiles and 85 ships are needed among other things. Eppelmann is also not willing to eliminate all major items of equipment. The document states that the troops will need 1,060 combat tanks and 2,352 armored combat vehicles. After talks with colleagues from East Berlin, the military experts of the Bonn coalition were convinced that the envisaged reduction of troops to 100,000 men will not be sufficient. "This is not sufficient," a leading military expert of the Christian Democratic Union stressed. "They must at least be reduced to 70,000."

Eppelmann Denies NVA Negotiations in Bonn

LD0207205990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2026 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest (ADN)—There is no delegation authorized by the Disarmament and Defense Ministry to negotiate with the Federal Defense Ministry in Bonn on the lifespan of the National People's Army [NVA]. Minister Rainer Eppelmann, who concluded his two-day visit to Hungary today, made this clarification in response to questions from ADN. The WELT AM SONNTAG had reported that an NVA delegation of this description had been in Bonn.

Meckel Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

Calls for Halving United German Army

LD0307102190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0922 GMT 3 Jul 90

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—Foreign Minister Markus Meckel addressed the Geneva disarmament conference today in support of a drastic reduction in all German Armed Forces. The ceiling for the Armed Forces of the united Germany could be fixed initially at a total of 300,000 soldiers. This halving of the present number of Armed Forces in the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army taken together should be included by both German states in the present CSCE negotiations in Vienna, Meckel said.

The foreign minister reassured the Geneva disarmament forum of his government's determination to make an active contribution to worldwide disarmament. The basis of the GDR Government's policy was a comprehensive understanding of security. "We are concerned with disarmament and human rights, environmental protection, the social and economic development of all people," Meckel said. "We are striving for a united Germany that is neither able nor would wish ever again

to become a center of military power, but rather a Germany that acts as a factor of peace and stability."

Further on Meckel Speech

LD0307120190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1056 GMT 3 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Geneva (ADN)—In the time remaining until the realization of German unity, the GDR Government will actively support real and verifiable measures geared toward a qualitatively new stage in European politics and worldwide disarmament. Foreign Minister Markus Meckel affirmed this to the Geneva disarmament conference today. By overcoming the ideological division of Europe and with the ending of the Cold War, new possibilities for disarmament are emerging. The GDR wished to contribute to this through unilateral commitments and active cooperation in the multilateral negotiations taking place in Geneva and Vienna. [passage omitted]

The GDR has renounced the manufacture, transfer, and possession of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons. It is striving to introduce an article to this effect in the constitution of a united Germany, Meckel said. "Not only chemical weapons, but all nuclear weapons must be removed from German soil."

A part of the arms spending of the two German states could benefit an all-German development policy, the foreign minister said. Furthermore, he supported the proposal of making available a third of the resources to be saved in the arms sector in the future for the economic development of the developing countries.

The GDR politician called on the Geneva disarmament conference to speed up, in particular, the work of the convention to universally ban chemical weapons. Within this multilateral framework, the way must be paved also for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

Citizens initiatives throughout the world—including those in the GDR—are expecting this of your conference.

At a news conference, Meckel emphasized that the Geneva disarmament conference must reflect the positive changes in Europe and throughout the world, and must provide new impulses for the disarmament process. He supported most emphatically the creation of a pan-European security system to take into account the interests of all involved, and in particular those of Germany's Eastern neighbors.

Recent U.S. Disarmament Proposals Viewed

AU0507165090 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 4 Jul 90 p 2

[Gerd Prokot editorial: "Confusion Before NATO Summit"]

[Text] Seldom in NATO's 40-year-old history has a NATO summit been linked with more expectations than the one beginning in London on Thursday [5 July]. Whereas one year ago the debate about the modernization of short-range missiles threatened to split NATO, differing views about the future role of NATO in a rapidly changing world are a matter for conflict this year. Whereas the European partners want to stress the political function of the alliance as in controlling the changes and plead for a reduction of the military potentials, the United States has so far not seen a need for fundamental changes. Secretary of State Baker made it clear last week that time is not yet ripe for abandoning the "flexible response" doctrine that provides for the first use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, it is all the more surprising that Bush, in letters to the heads of state and government of the West European NATO allies, has allegedly proposed renouncing the early use of nuclear weapons. They should only be considered a last resort. As a matter of fact, this is not a real change of position, but it represents a remarkable correction of the U.S. course. Even if this may primarily be dictated by the intention to wrest agreement from the Soviet Union to full membership in NATO of a united Germany, this offer is a step in the right direction. U.S. intentions, however, would be more credible if it completely renounced nuclear modernization, instead of withdrawing 1,400 outdated and partly defective nuclear warheads.

De Maiziere on European Cooperation, Disarmament

LD0507110490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0952 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Text" of statement by Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere to People's Chamber in East Berlin on 5 July]

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—I

In recent days our attention has been directed at renewal and change in domestic policy. Foreign policy activities, however, are of equally great significance. The Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow, the NATO summit in London, East-West relations in general, and also the 28th CPSU Congress provide the framework within which the chances for European cooperation will develop.

For the first time, we are involved on our own responsibility in realizing European cooperation. The contrast between East and West, which for 40 years has divided and split Europe, is dissolving. We are in a period of transitions to new forms of international relations. The desire for peaceful and sincere cooperation determines our foreign policy. The age of the Cold War is finally ending. We must not waste or gamble away this unique chance that history is giving us. The Iron Curtain has fallen; in its place are coming bridges and links.

In this connection the fundamental question about the GDR's foreign policy is: How can we best make our

contribution to the simultaneous overcoming of the division of Germany and the division of Europe? How can we make use of the transitional period until the completion of Germany's unity in order to create a secure entry into a new Europe of cooperation?

The overcoming of Germany's division must not mean that GDR history and its memory are extinguished. For the people between the Elbe and the Oder the GDR's existence will certainly not become a mere footnote in world history and in their own lives. To have lived in the GDR will remain part of our personal biography. Equally, the autumn of 1989 is one of the most important events in the history of Germans on the path to democracy and, therefore, will remain unforgettable. We are bringing this experience into our common German future.

II

One important aspect of our foreign policy is to implement German unity in good harmony with our neighbors.

Particularly with a view to our past, we have an obligation to deal circumspectly with our neighbors' sensitivities. Hence, the borders in Europe are for us inviolable, immovable, and no longer up for discussion.

Both German states want to cooperate as equal partners with their neighbors to help overcome the division of Europe caused by the Second World War and to promote security and cooperation in Europe.

The forum for this is the two-plus-four talks. On 22 June the second foreign ministers' meeting took place within the framework of these negotiations. The talks have entered their crucial phase. All sides have shown their readiness for compromise. The difficulties are no longer insurmountable.

All sides involved in the two-plus-four talks are adopting a constructive attitude.

None of the four powers is attempting to perpetuate its original rights or to encroach upon the united Germany's sovereignty in any way. On the contrary: all are trying to end as soon as possible the existing, in many ways special, situation in which Germany has found itself since the Second World War. Everyone wants this. The still outstanding differences of opinion relate solely to the question of how the balance of security in Europe, which for over 40 years has ensured peace—defined here as the absence of war—can be ensured equally effectively by means of new treaties. Thus we can move from peace preservation to the active shaping of peace.

The two German states are partners and affected parties in the two-plus-four negotiations and are seeking with the other partners a stable settlement which will embrace all of Europe. A glance at history will show that there has often been serious attempts to secure lasting peace for Europe. These good intentions often foundered even after a short time, primarily because instability also

found its way into the structure. Avoiding this in the future demands of all those involved the highest degree of trust, goodwill, and sober calculation. Honesty and foreign policy are inseparably linked. Compromise formulas which subsequently are interpreted differently by each party should finally be consigned to the past.

The difficult issues which are to be negotiated in the next few weeks include transitional stipulations for ending the overall responsibility of the four victorious powers for the whole of Germany.

A united Germany, this is our declared aim, must be as sovereign as the other states in Europe. For us sovereignty is not a possession to be jealously guarded. A united Europe will only deserve the name if certain sovereign rights are surrendered to Europe in the process of European unification. This applies to all and prevents national arrogance. It minimizes international conflicts. It is a welcome consequence of this policy that finally the territories of the GDR and the FRG will no longer have the rank of the most heavily armed region in the world. In the military planning games of the last few decades, Central Europe was a marching area for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This condition must be ended and should not be moved to other regions.

The aim of mutual noncapacity to attack set down in the mandate for the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces remains valid. To this end, the option existing with conventional forces of offensive operations must be abolished. In the process of conventional disarmament all stocks of nuclear and ABC [nuclear, biological, chemical] weapons must be drastically reduced. Our aim is a removal of all conventional nuclear and ABC weapons.

We are looking with great expectations to the NATO summit, which is now taking place in London. From our viewpoint, NATO must see itself as an alliance of democratic and free states in a comprehensive sense, and fundamentally reform its structure and strategy. This means ending the previous strategy of flexible response, together with first use of nuclear weapons and forward defense. This would be a decisive contribution to a lasting peace in Europe with suitable security guarantees.

As long ago as 1967, with the adoption of the Harmel report, NATO set itself the aim of "achieving a just and lasting peace order in Europe with suitable security guarantees." The decisive preconditions for this are now given. The historic moment demands a political signal of comparable significance which adds to the 1967 vision specific ideas and proposals for its implementation.

The Warsaw Pact is at present in what must be the most difficult phase of its existence. For the GDR this is a special challenge in terms of foreign and security policy. The GDR's alliance policy toward the Warsaw Pact should not lead to an obstacle for German unification. Neither should German unification provoke any disregard for the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union and the other East European states. This means the Warsaw Pact must, as it now stands, be cautiously

changed, also with the help of the GDR. We need an all-European security system. Overcoming the blocs and not shifting the blocs is our aim.

It was the concern of state and government heads of the seven members states at the Political Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw Pact states on 7 June 1990 in Moscow to inaugurate a change in the Warsaw Pact from a military to a political organization. At the meeting it was decided to fundamentally examine the Warsaw Pact's character, function, and activity. On the path to a real European security community, a transformed Warsaw Pact could help, together with NATO, to bring about and secure an ordered transition from East-West confrontation to a European peace order.

III

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, at his latest meeting with U.S. President George Bush, suggested that the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states should settle issues connected with the security policy aspects of German unification and the transition to a European peace order. The GDR takes a positive view of this idea.

In our view, the following fundamental elements should be contained in such a treaty:

- a nonaggression undertaking;
- an agreement on lasting security policy cooperation between both alliances within the framework of the CSCE process;
- a renunciation by the future Germany of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, which will apply to the development, production, purchase, deployment, and transit of such weapons;
- transitional rules and the fixing of a schedule on the deployment of foreign forces in, and their withdrawal from, Germany.

The future security alliance to which Germany is to belong must be of a primarily political nature. Its main task will be ensuring peace by means of an adequate capacity for defense, linked to arms control and disarmament, as well as the creation of all-European security structures.

IV

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe has, in the past, proved valuable to the exchange of opinions and the mutual understanding of differing opinions. The CSCE is the ideal forum through which to interweave the German unification process with the reshaping of Europe. With its mechanisms of follow-up meetings and expert talks, it has become a recognized body which should now be institutionalized. The CSCE must take the form of an amalgamation binding under international law. To this end, the GDR Government, together with the CSFR and the Republic of Poland, submitted on 12 June 1990 a proposal to the other CSCE states on institutionalizing the CSCE process. The three countries proposed the introduction of regular—that is,

taking place at least once every two years—meetings of state and government heads of CSCE states. They also propose the creation of a European Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This should meet, as a rule, twice a year at the foreign minister level, and should be accorded extensive authority. A permanent secretariat based in Prague should be assigned to it. Regular meetings of specialist ministers should also be held, in the GDR Government's view.

The council would determine the tasks for two CSCE centers. The "Center for Conference-Building, Arms Control, and Verification," based in Berlin, would be concerned largely with the monitoring of treaties agreed in the area of military security.

The "Center for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts," the seat of which has not yet been decided and must be discussed, should help gather information on possible causes of and possibilities for resolving potential conflicts and military disputes, and to prevent their occurrence. The succession of meetings and conferences, agreed in the concluding document of the Vienna meeting, is to be maintained.

In order to stress the CSCE's special importance for East-West dialogue, the GDR Government has proposed that the results of the two-plus-four negotiations be submitted to the CSCE summit at the end of this year.

At the CSCE conference on the "human dimension" in Copenhagen from 5 to 29 June, the GDR set a new line. It was a conscious decision by the GDR Government to appoint a member of the citizens' movement that emerged from the peace and human rights movement in the GDR as the head of our delegation. This created an opportunity for members of nonstate initiatives to participate in the conference as guests of the delegation.

The GDR Government welcomes the results of the Copenhagen meeting. The concluding document provides decisive progress in safeguarding the citizens' freedoms and also on the question of observing and monitoring the implementation of human rights. The GDR Government would particularly like to stress that the right to free elections and the opportunity to file for the observance of this right, like the principles of political pluralism and the rule of law and rights of national minorities, have now been anchored in a pan-European way.

The document has achieved a new quality in the implementation of unified human rights standards in the whole of Europe. This could provide an initial boost to the shaping of cooperation in other spheres of the CSCE.

The GDR delegation, together with the FRG delegation, submitted a proposal on protecting against tyranny, totalitarianism, racial hatred, anti-Semitism, and the persecution of religious and philosophical dissenters. Like the GDR proposal aimed at securing social human rights, this found a place in the final document.

V

Europe is growing from below. The people in Europe must have greater possibilities of getting to know one another; of gaining awareness of what they have in common, but also how they differ; and of learning mutual tolerance. The GDR Government supports all considerations aimed at setting up a pan-European youth organization. The young people of Europe must get to know one another. This includes speaking at least one language of a neighboring country and meeting as frequently as possible, in order to perceive the particular customs and traditions of other countries and to accept them as self-evident. An international youth policy, in the interests of understanding, is the best possible investment in a peaceful future.

Overcoming the division of Europe will remain superficial if it is not carried through by the people themselves. The idea of a common Europe is not only restricted to the possibility of being included in the economic development of West Europe.

Under the conditions of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany state, cut off from the outside world, it was not possible for such a European consciousness to develop in the GDR. Thus we need an intensified dialogue, beyond our borders, and in particular with our immediate neighbors. We support all activities directed to this end. Thus the heritage of the East European democracy and human rights movements, also indispensable to the shaping of a common Europe, can be preserved.

VI

The vote on 18 March brought with it an unequivocal duty for GDR citizens to advance with haste along the path to a mutuality of European states. An important step along this path is the integration of the GDR into the EC, which will go into effect with German unity. This is a major task, and one which we must master with responsibility and care.

The EC has led to the formation on our continent of a stable community. Over a period of 30 years it has made an important contribution to the promotion of economic prosperity, stability, and peace among West European countries. A particular feature is the balance between economically strong and economically weak regions. This community must not lose its dynamism. The process of German unification must strengthen the power of the community; it may not and will not lessen it.

From the start, the GDR Government endorsed unification. This is reflected also in the provisions of the State Treaty, which unequivocally lays down the principle of integration into the EC.

Some of the first foreign contacts made by the GDR prime minister and foreign minister took the form of visits to the EC Commission in Brussels and Strasbourg. The spirit of European solidarity which we found here made a particular impression upon us. Thus a joint

course of action could be forged, in a friendly and yet pertinent manner, for overcoming the problems confronting us. We wish to ensure that no EC state suffers adverse effects from the economic unification of Germany process. We have provided information on the current situation and on the projects in the various sectors of the GDR's economy, and will continue to do so. Agreement was also reached during the talks that specialists from the individual GDR ministries should exchange views with the EC Commission on the necessary transitional regulations for the GDR.

Both sides are in agreement that in such difficult areas as, for example, agriculture and fisheries, the GDR economy cannot immediately be fully subjected to EC regulations. The period until we face competition in the EC can only last a few years.

The GDR is bringing into the EC a pool of experience which no one else can provide. This relates to relations with the countries of East and Central Europe. No one has been able to collect such knowledge and experience, partially—of course—founded on errors and false assessments.

We are striving to consolidate the economic links that have grown up in the general change in the economy. The negotiations with the USSR and the other CEMA states to transfer the existing trade contracts to a Deutsche mark basis have been conducted intensively in recent weeks and are as good as concluded.

The principle of maintaining trust was laid down in the State Treaty. Politically the two German states have thereby committed themselves to bringing the GDR's relations with the CEMA states into European unification. We are striving to secure and expand economic cooperation with CEMA states through economic promotion of our enterprises. This secures jobs in the GDR and also in East Europe.

In all this we should not overlook the European Council. This oldest West European organization from the post war period has played a fundamental role in the defense of human rights, and in strengthening the rule of law, political pluralism, and the cultural identity of West Europe. Its significance will grow further for interstate cooperation in view of overcoming the division of Europe. It has adapted very quickly to the changes in Central and East Europe and offered its good services to all interested states. The GDR received special guest status. This means that involvement in parliamentary assembly of the European Council is open to us, and we can enter a series of European Council conventions.

During the GDR foreign minister's visit to the European Council we sounded out the possibility of membership in the 1950 human rights convention, for which we declare unreserved support.

VII

In view of the fact that our attention in the last few weeks has been concentrated above all on the changes inside the GDR, people in developing countries are asking whether we are neglecting or even forgetting them. We are aware of our responsibility in a closely integrated world. The end of the East-West conflict confronts us more than ever with the task of doing all that is in our power to do justice to our responsibility in the North-South conflict.

In its very first government statement, the government came out in favor of a more just international economic order. This includes a trade policy which gives the Third World a real chance in the world market and is based on solidarity and partnership. We should not forget: In the Third World it is often a matter of pure survival; with us it is a matter of living better. There is an enormous difference!

The GDR will continue in full economic, medical, and social development cooperation with its previous partner countries. In addition, there will increasingly be an all-German commitment in the Third World. In this we share the realization that any aid must support the efforts of the Third World states themselves and strengthen their confidence in their own powers.

VIII

This government has not yet been in office for 100 days. Much has been demanded of it in many areas, all at the same time. Nor will this change in the next few months.

Be assured that in the future we will continue:

- to order internal GDR affairs as before in a decisive, circumspect, and socially responsible way;
- and to handle external affairs cautiously, in a balanced way, in security policy terms, and with a great sense of responsibility for peace.

Army Had Soviet Intermediate-Range Missiles

*AU0907163090 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
9 Jul 90 p 15*

[Unattributed report: "Secret Missiles"]

[Text] Since the early eighties, the GDR National People's Army [NVA] had Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Despite sophisticated espionage technology and satellite observation, the existence of two dozen SS-23's with four launch pads remained secret to Western secret services. The weapons, which can also be equipped with nuclear warheads (range: approximately 500 km), were stored in an NVA hall in Dömitz near Schwerin. In a detailed letter, a former NVA reserve lieutenant briefed Manfred Woerner, former FRG defense minister and present NATO secretary general, on the "secret weapons" of the missile brigade in the northern military district as early as 1987. Neither the Federal Intelligence Office nor the ministry reacted to the information. Now, three years later, the NVA informer received an answer from Gerhard Stoltenberg, Woerner's successor in the Defense Ministry. "Since your last letter significant progress has been made in arms control policies," the minister wrote.

Soviet Poisonous Gas Reportedly Stored in GDR**Nine Sites Alleged**

*LD1007124490 Hamburg DPA in German
1128 GMT 10 Jul 90*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—The Soviet Armed Forces have some 30,000 tonnes of poisonous gas stored in the GDR. The German Press Agency (DPA) learned this from Bonn security circles today. Previously, the Soviets have always maintained that they stored poisonous gas supplies only in their own country. The chemical weapons are apparently stored in nine depots along the intra-German border, it was learned.

According to newspaper reports, troops of the Red Army and of the National People's Army (NVA) even used the chemical weapons to conduct "defensive chemical weapons deployment exercises" on GDR territory. The public-owned Dresden pharmacological works appears also to have been responsible for producing chemical weapons intermittently, at least prior to 1985. It was under Soviet supervision in this.

According to Western secret services, Moscow's Armed Forces have nine storage sites for various kinds of warfare agents on their own soil. A further 32 sites are situated in Warsaw Pact countries: four in Poland, nine in the GDR, nine in the CSFR, five in Hungary, four in Romania, and one in Bulgaria. They accommodate types of nerve gas, skin poisons, and bloodstream and shock weapons. They "cover a broad spectrum of tactical and operational deployment possibilities."

Around 40 percent of the Soviet chemical weapons are designated for artillery, in the conventional calibers for mortar and howitzer shells, and for warheads, according to the secret service reports. There were also chemical aircraft bombs. In total, the Western secret service estimates indicate a wide range: It is assumed that the Soviet Union possesses between 200,000 and 700,000 tonnes of poisonous gas supplies. [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry Denies Gas Storage

*LD1007124890 Hamburg DPA in German
1204 GMT 10 Jul 90*

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—The press spokesman of the East Berlin Ministry for Disarmament and Defense, Colonel Uwe Hempel, denied that Soviet poisonous gas and chemical weapons are being stored in the GDR. Representatives of the ministry spoke with the Supreme Command of Soviet Armed Forces today. The Soviets confirmed, as previously, that "they are not storing any chemical warfare agents or weapons in the GDR."

HUNGARY**Soviet Troop Withdrawal Proceeds on Schedule**

LD0207155390 Budapest MTI in English 1407 GMT 2 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 2 (MTI)—By midnight on Sunday, a total of 313 Soviet Army trains have left Hungarian territory, which conforms to the schedule set down in agreement.

This was reported to MTI by Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman of the Ministry of Home Defence, who said a total of 12,068 Soviet soldiers returned to their country with family members counting 6,982.

By the end of June 4,602 combat technical equipment have been shipped out of Hungary, including over 350 tanks. In addition, some 103,000 tonnes of various material was freighted across the border into the USSR.

Chief Negotiator on Soviet Troop Withdrawals

*LD0507155290 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0445 GMT 5 Jul 90*

[Interview with Major General Antal Annus, leader of the Hungarian group negotiating the departure of Soviet troops, by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] As you have already heard in our report, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall yesterday met the Soviet Ambassador. [passage omitted] I ask Major General Antal Annus, leader of the Hungarian negotiating party, which are the disputed questions in this stage of the negotiations, what are the choices for Hungary, and is it conceivable to have some sort of compromise?

[Annus] We cannot talk about a compromise yet, because, so far, the Soviet party does not yet acknowledge that a single Hungarian demand is justified. Thus, we could only give one-sided concessions. However, by doing so, we would seriously violate Hungarian interests.

In the first place, I could mention our demands regarding the compensation for damages resulting from neglecting repairs, renewals, and service. This is what the condition of the 12 pieces of real estate handed over last year show. In contrast to the Soviet demand for 400 million [currency not specified], the value of the Hungarian damage is double this amount due to neglected repairs.

[Correspondent] The Soviet party alleges that the damages are caused by the fact that after being handed over, these buildings are not protected by the Hungarians; thus, they are practically ransacked.

[Annus] This is not true. The handing over of this real estate is carried out via the work of a joint Hungarian-Soviet group of experts, the state of the buildings is documented jointly, it is laid down in the minutes by the experts with great detail, and both parties sign them. So, even subsequently, it can be very precisely ascertained what condition these buildings were in at the time they were handed over.

First, the Soviet demand was 2.7 billion rubles [R] and, in their view, this equals about 50 billion forints. Then later, they published other details as well, I emphasize, they, the Soviet party. For example, they talked about R2.8 billion, then R2.5 billion. What is more, last week, when a working group of the Soviet parliament visited here, they talked about R1.5 billion.

[Correspondent] So this sum keeps changing.

[Annus] It is possible that in this amount, there are also sums included which they are obliged to spend on the buildings as a compensation for rent. They would like to make out an account every time real estate is handed over.

What we say is that time is needed to work out the amounts that are regarded as the rightful demands of Hungary, therefore, it is expedient to make an account at the end. [passage omitted]

It will come to light at the end what the costs are. If at the end the balance will show that the Hungarian Republic owes the Soviet Union for the investments carried out, then we shall have to—and we will—pay up.

[Correspondent] Since the last statement of Burlakov, obviously, many people are worried. How is the troop withdrawal progressing these days and is everything alright?

[Annus] Yes, I can say with pleasure that up until today, the troop withdrawal is progressing in order according to the schedule laid down in the agreement, practically without a hitch, everything is up to date.

[Correspondent] Are you prepared for an event threatened by Burlakov? That is that they might stop the troop withdrawal if they do not come to an agreement with the Hungarian party regarding the disputed issues?

[Annus] In my opinion, they cannot do this. This agreement was not signed by General Burlakov and the Hungarian Republic, but the Hungarian Republic and the Soviet Union. So the two governments took responsibility for keeping this agreement.

[Correspondent] What is the reality of the Soviets halting or slowing down the troop withdrawal?

[Annus] In an extreme case they can, of course, because they are the ones withdrawing; they are, so to speak, still within the property. But I do not think that this will come about, because it would be an open and harsh violation of the agreement.

[Correspondent] But, let us say it will occur nonetheless. Do you or the Hungarian Army and the Ministry of Defense have some sort of concept, plan, or program as to what can be done in a situation like this?

[Annus] If, in an extreme situation, this were still to come about, then the two governments have to settle matters, naturally, not excluding international consultations and wide ranging reporting, as well as disclosing to the world what happened here—I stress, if such an extreme situation

were to occur. However, I would like to point out again that I trust progress can also be made regarding the accounting.

POLAND

Franco-Polish Disarmament Proposal Seeks Combat Vehicle Limitations

90WC0082A Paris *LE MONDE* in French
16 Jun 90 p 6

[Article by Waltraud Baryli: "Paris and Warsaw Try To Break Impasse in Vienna Negotiations"]

[Text] Vienna—On Thursday 14 June at the Vienna disarmament negotiations, France and Poland offered a joint proposal establishing definitions and ceilings for tanks and armored combat vehicles. Mr. Francois Plaisant, head of the French delegation, told the press the initiative marked a "breakthrough" in negotiations, which have been at an impasse in recent months.

Mr. Plaisant said that during the morning plenary session the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact voiced no objections to the initiative, which he described as "the subject of informal but full agreement on the part of the 23 countries" participating in the talks. The more cautious Polish representative refrained from using the term "agreement," merely noting that "many of the Eastern and Western countries" supported the Franco-Polish proposal.

A little later, however, the Americans disclosed that during a subsequent working group meeting the Soviets brought up problems they had not raised during the plenary session. It seems that though the Soviets agreed to work from the Franco-Polish text, they insisted that further discussions at the technical level were needed to prepare lists of the various types of tanks involved.

The Franco-Polish proposal calls for a ceiling of 20,000 tracked and wheeled tanks for each alliance. Only vehicles with an empty weight of 16.5 tons or more would fall into this category. The proposal also calls for a ceiling of 30,000 armored combat vehicles, with a sub-ceiling of 18,000 for armored infantry combat vehicles and heavy weapons vehicles, and a special sub-ceiling of 1,500 for heavy weapons vehicles weighing six tons or more.

If this proposal were adopted, negotiators could turn their attention to the controversial issue of warplanes and combat helicopters. Among other things, the USSR refuses to include its land-based naval aviation assets in the negotiations; this position is unacceptable to NATO, which argues that modern warplanes can carry out effective surprise attacks.

The Soviets are also demanding numerical limits on the strength of the Bundeswehr, and that is the main reason the negotiations have been stalled. Western negotiators believe agreement on military materiel must be reached before troop strength issues are addressed in a second phase of the Vienna talks.

BRAZIL**Progress in Heavy Water Production Discussed**

90WP0099A Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese
26 May 90 p 16

[Article by Elza Oliveira]

[Text] Curitiba—By the end of this year, Brazil may succeed in producing 40 liters of heavy water (deuterium oxide) in a concentration of 99.6 percent. The first steps toward mastering that technology—which the country cannot acquire abroad because it has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—are being taken at the Brazil Peroxides plant in Curitiba. Under the terms of an agreement signed with the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) last year, the firm is beginning the process of concentrating heavy water, which is used as a moderator in natural uranium reactors like those used in Argentina.

Yesterday marked the start of the project's third phase, the purpose of which is to achieve a 10-percent concentration—that is, 100,000 parts per million. The remaining 90 percent will be the responsibility of the CNEN, which will organize the fourth and fifth phases of concentration at the Parana Technology Institute (Tecpar) or at the commission's own laboratories in Rio de Janeiro. The process being used is catalytic exchange combined with electrolysis.

"Signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the same as submitting to the law of the strongest. We are not interested in developing nuclear weapons, but if Brazil were a signatory to the document, we could not even carry out this research," says engineer Teofilo Portela Chagas, who is overseeing the project for the CNEN.

He says that Brazil needs the technology for obtaining heavy water in order to guarantee its development because all the projections indicate that hydrogen will be the fuel of the future.

"There is no such thing as bad technology. What there is is bad use of it: the same knife that we use to slice a good barbecue can also kill a person," says Chagas, a student of the nuclear question who was a member of the first research group for the production of heavy water. That group was set up at the IME [Military Engineering Institute] in 1964.

Brazil Peroxides was chosen to be a partner in the research—since heavy water, being a material used in the nuclear industry, is a monopoly of the Federal Government—because the firm has the necessary facilities for carrying out the project at low cost. The plant has a unit for the electrolysis of water that was intended to produce 15,000 metric tons of hydrogen peroxide (oxygenated water) per year, and it can produce as much as 22,000 metric tons per year.

Marcio Coimbra, the firm's industrial manager, says: "From the standpoint of Brazil Peroxides, this project enables us to study the possibility of reducing the cost of producing electrolytic hydrogen by recovering deuterium oxide as a byproduct."

Chagas says: "Fossil fuels are going to become scarce, and hydrogen, which is renewable and nonpolluting, will be the main engine fuel in the next century. One proof of this is the fact that the Mariner interplanetary probes launched by the United States are looking for the existence of heavy water in the universe, and they have found deuterium in the atmospheres of Jupiter and Saturn. Perhaps that is where spacecraft of the future will refuel for their trips through space."

EGYPT

Air Defense Commander Comments on New Systems

JN2806154490 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic
26 Jun 90 p 1

[Text] Lieutenant General Mustafa al-Shadhili, commander of the Air Defense Forces, has reported that work has been done on the anti-aircraft "Sky Guard" system, which is called the "Egyptian Amun," to introduce modifications increasing its effectiveness and combat efficiency; it has been dubbed "Amun 2 B." Lt. Gen. al-Shadhili said: We are studying the acquisition of U.S. "Patriot" missiles so as to complete our air defense system. He explained that this fell within the framework of making state-of-the-art technology available to our forces. He noted that the Air Defense command welcomes arrangements with Arab states and is ready to meet all their needs. He referred in this regard to the success of Egyptian-Kuwaiti cooperation.

At a press conference yesterday on the Air Defense's 20th anniversary, Lt. Gen. al-Shadhili added that the command and control system in the Air Defense and Air Command will be turned into an automatic command system this year. He said that a full model of the automatic command and control equipment will be displayed on 15 July, during a graduation ceremony at the Air Defense College in Alexandria. He said two exhibitions, one indoors and another outdoors, will be held to show the most sophisticated air defense equipment in the world, as well as the developments introduced by our forces to equipment from the West and the East.

Lt. Gen. al-Shadhili explained that the Air Defense Forces have an ongoing role in both peace and war. He said: Reconnaissance flights are conducted daily in our skies to detect any threats and to get a better picture of the situation in the air to be ready to repulse any aggression in our skies. He said our forces are also developing Eastern missiles further with the aim of defeating electronic jamming devices and enhancing the missiles' efficiency. He added that an air-to-air missile has been developed and the radar battalions command center has been automatically linked with eastern and western radar systems. In addition, airborne warning devices send information about the air situation automatically to ground stations.

INDIA

Pakistan's Acquisition of Soviet Arms Causes Concern

BK2906150290 Delhi Domestic Service in English
1430 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Text] India has expressed concern over Pakistan's reported moves to purchase the latest variety of Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers along with

matching missile systems. Responding to newsmen's queries in New Delhi today, the spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said that these arms and ammunition are thought to be obtained not from the Soviet Union directly but from other sources.

While ruling out any impact of Islamabad's action on the forthcoming Indo-Pak talks at the foreign secretaries level, the spokesman affirmed that government will take appropriate measures to defend the country's borders. Informed sources in New Delhi, however, say that India will definitely take up the issue with Pakistan during the proposed talks. The spokesman pointed out that the influx of sophisticated arms into Pakistan will reinforce terrorist activities in Kashmir and Punjab, as it would give a boost to the forces of militancy and fundamentalism.

Outgoing General Discusses Nuclear Options

BK3006113090 Hong Kong AFP in English 1035 GMT
30 Jun 90

[Text] New Delhi, June 30 (AFP)—India would have no option but to possess nuclear weapons if a potentially hostile neighbour also acquired the bomb, India's outgoing army chief of staff said here Saturday [30 June]. In an obvious reference to Pakistan, currently believed to have or be on the verge of perfecting its own bomb, Chief of Army Staff General V.N. Sharma said in an interview on All India Radio that unless the Indian Armed Forces possessed such a capability, it would have no deterrent.

"A reply to a nuclear weapon capability of a potential hostile nation is to possess the same capability yourself," he said.

However he said the decision on whether or not to have "such weapons" was in the hands of "our people and the government" and not in the hands of the Armed Forces. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, but said then the capability would be used for strictly peaceful purposes.

Relations with Pakistan have deteriorated in the past four months over the issue of a secessionist movement in Indian-controlled Kashmir, with New Delhi accusing Islamabad of fuelling the campaign. Despite the two countries' Armed Forces commanders staying in touch by hot-line both sides are known to be conducting troop manoeuvres on their common border. The two countries have fought three wars since independence from Britain in 1947, two of them over Kashmir.

Without mentioning Pakistan by name, the general described the current geo-political climate as "tense" and predicted India would face what he described as some difficulties in the near future. The general also expressed his concern at the effects on the Indian Army's training and budget of being used in tackling internal law and order situations, saying he was in favor of setting up a U.S.-style national guard. He praised the present government's idea of trying to raise a force made up of

ex-army officers and men saying it should reduce the number of times the army had to be called out within India's boundaries, but added that for "a few years to come" there was no option but to use the army.

Indian Army units are currently being used to tackle the virulent secessionist movement in Moslem-majority Kashmir and are frequently called out in the rest of the country when police and paramilitary fail to control communal riots or separatist outbreaks.

Gen. Sharma, who retired Saturday after 40 years of service in the Indian Army, the world's fourth largest, is to be replaced Sunday [1 July] by General S. F. Rodrigues, 56, currently chief of the army's strategic Western Command. Gen. Rodrigues' position in the Western Command is to be taken by Lieutenant General G.S. Grewal, a corps commander.

IRAQ

Hamdoon Affirms Chemical Weapon Retaliation

AU0407153390 Vienna Television Service in German
2105 GMT 3 Jul 90

[Report on interview with (Nizar Hamdoon), state secretary in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, by ORF correspondent Hans Benedict; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Benedict] (Nizar Hamdoon), state secretary in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, details the consequences of an escalation of the crisis [between Iraq and Israel].

[Begin (Hamdoon) recording] Iraq will respond to any attack by Israel. If Israel uses nuclear weapons, we will retaliate with chemical weapons. [end recording]

PAKISTAN

Daily Urges Acquisition of Nuclear Deterrent

BK2306133290 Karachi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
10 Jun 90 p 3

[Editorial: "Internal Unity, Nuclear Deterrent—Real Defense"]

[Text] According to a NEW YORK TIMES report, if Pakistan and India fail to resolve their differences over the Kashmir dispute and go to war in the coming few months, this will be the first war in history in which the two sides might resort to using nuclear weapons. The report notes that India is capable of dropping 40 to 60 atom bombs on target with the help of its 200 sophisticated aircraft. This is enough to destroy Pakistan's five major cities. Pakistan's nuclear capability is less than that of India's. Pakistan can only manufacture five to 10 atom bombs and has 40 to 50 sophisticated aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons on target.

The concern expressed by the U.S. newspaper about a future war between India and Pakistan actually reflects the apprehensions of the United States and the entire Western world. It is due to the fear of a nuclear war that Washington and Western countries are trying to help avert by all means the possibility of war. Is there be a bigger joke than the people of the United States and Europe becoming worshippers of peace?

Anyway, it must be made clear to the world that Pakistan is a peace-loving country on which India had imposed two wars in the past. Even today, India has not only been carrying out massacres in occupied Kashmir through its armed forces, it has also moved troops out of its cantonments and deployed them on borders to intimidate Pakistan which fully reserves the right to strengthen its defense positions—a right which the United States, Europe or the free world cannot deny it.

But, Pakistan's problem is that it does not have an arms stockpile equivalent to what India has built up, making its people victims of poverty, hunger, and starvation in the process. Pakistan also cannot push back aggressor India's military force through conventional means, because when we compare only the naval strength of the two countries, we find that it is virtually impossible for Pakistan to take on India's blue water Navy. In addition to that, the Pakistani Army is performing double duty in Karachi; and if the Army also has to shoulder civilian responsibilities in the event of war, the country's defense will be left only to God.

At present, Pakistan is facing both internal and external dangers and its only way out is to immediately control the domestic unrest and find ways and means to forge national unity. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to eliminate the agents of [India's] "Research and Analysis Wing" and other foreign agents and subversives who have infiltrated into the ranks of the people of major cities like Karachi, creating disturbances as and when they want.

On the other hand, Pakistan must not shy away from exercising its option of nuclear deterrence, as it has no other means of staving off a possible Indian aggression. Pakistan is a peace-loving country and it does not want to vitiate the atmosphere of peace and reconciliation now prevailing in the world, but it will never compromise its national security and independence. Since it is not possible for Pakistan to face India's challenge and meet its formidable war machines with conventional weapons and worn-out strategy, it must therefore exercise the nuclear-weapon option, so that India will not dare attack Pakistan for fear of Islamabad's retaliation.

In fact, the atom bomb can be a deterrent. The reason why world nations, especially the two superpowers, are striving for peace is that each side knows the other is not weak. Pakistan too, by acquiring the same level of capability, can succeed in keeping India from committing any mischief against it.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact Proposed

*BK0807162390 Hong Kong AFP in English
1551 GMT 8 Jul 90*

[Text] Islamabad, July 8 (AFP)—Pakistan called Sunday for implementing a nuclear non-proliferation pact in South Asia amid growing international concern that India and Pakistan might use atomic weapons in a war on Kashmir.

Foreign Secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan said he was ready to discuss the issue with his Indian counterpart, Muchkund Dubey, who arrives here on July 17 for two days of talks on de-escalating tensions over the Kashmir dispute.

Troops of the two hostile neighbours have massed along their border in the wake of an uprising in the Indian-administered sector of disputed Kashmir, over which India and Pakistan have fought two of their three wars.

U.S. Senator Alan Cranston this week expressed fears after visiting India and Pakistan that if another war broke out it would develop into a nuclear exchange.

But Mr. Khan said he did not think "there is such a danger now."

He said Pakistan hoped that "long before such a danger arises," India and Pakistan would be able to reach a nuclear non-proliferation agreement.

"The international concern makes it more urgent that we develop a regime in South Asia which brings confidence that there will be no danger of a nuclear holocaust even in the distant future," he said.

He said Pakistan had made several proposals and added he would "be very happy to discuss them with the Indian foreign secretary."

Mr. Khan spoke as Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral renewed allegations that Pakistan was

"supporting, financing and training" militants waging secessionist campaigns in Indian Punjab and Kashmir.

The Pakistani foreign secretary rejected the charges, saying, "We have denied it in the past and we deny it again."

"No outside power can bring to the streets hundreds of thousands of people Friday after Friday and day after day," he said referring to frequent pro-separatist rallies in Srinagar, hub of the Moslem movement and summer capital of Indian Kashmir.

Mr. Khan said India had intensified its repression in Kashmir Thursday when it gave security forces within the state wide-ranging powers to put down the separatist campaign.

"Granting extreme power to a security force which has already earned extreme odium to shoot without commanders' instructions is fraught with danger," he warned.

"This kind of escalation can only vitiate the atmosphere," he said.

He said Pakistan hoped that India's latest crackdown would not jeopardise the forthcoming talks, when he said the two sides would discuss the "root cause" of the dispute.

Islamabad has long argued that the Kashmiris should determine their own future, while New Delhi says Kashmir's accession to India after Britain relinquished control of the subcontinent in 1947 is still valid.

Mr. Khan said there was no pre-arranged agenda for the upcoming talks and hoped the Indians would approach the discussions in an open manner.

"We will be ready to discuss the confidence-building measures" the Indians have suggested, he said. "But the core issue is Kashmir and redeployment of troops to peace-time locations."

New USSR Military Doctrines Examined

AU2706060190 Moscow PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA
in Russian No 5, May 1990 (signed to press 2 April 1990) pp 51-53

[Abridged interviews with and excerpts from speeches by participants at the Vienna seminar on current military doctrines of Warsaw Pact, NATO, and neutral and nonaligned European states, including Army Generals Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Colin Powell, chairman of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces; and other high-ranking military figures; date not given: "Have the Generals Adopted New Thinking?"]

[Text] Mankind is nearing the 45th anniversary of the crushing defeat of fascist Germany in an encouraging atmosphere of relaxation in the international climate and rapid democratic changes in the majority of the countries which went through the fire of World War II. At the same time, many things continue to worry people, and not without reason.

The poet who wrote that the Victory Day smells of gunpowder...is right indeed. However, today it is particularly important to emphasize that it was not only the glorious, heroic, and great, but also the LAST VICTORY in a WORLD war. A third war may only be unleashed but nobody can win it. As far back as the dawn of the nuclear era, the great physicist A. Einstein said that the discovery of atomic energy has changed everything in the world except for thinking. Thinking must also become completely different—mankind is now united by a common fate which demands that, for the sake of survival, violence be eliminated from international life. The ideas of curbing the arms race and preventing a nuclear disaster increasingly captivate people who adhere to most diverse convictions and views. The new thinking which has been elevated to the rank of Soviet foreign policy and which is now being shared by leaders of many other states has led to a termination of a protracted confrontational era.

However, do the military themselves think in new terms? Do not those who hold in their hands the means of multiple destruction of all life on earth remain hostages to past approaches? More than two years ago the USSR suggested that high-ranking military leaders of 33 European countries, United States, and Canada meet to compare and discuss military doctrines. Many people considered this initiative to be utopian—who would disclose his own "military secrets?" Such cases are not known to history. However, this is now fait accompli. In the mid-January of 1990, chiefs of staff and other prominent representatives of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and neutral and nonaligned European states arrived in the capital of Austria. The seminar on military doctrines lasted three weeks. The spacious halls of the Vienna Hofburg Palace had never seen such a gathering of military "stars."

In which way do military doctrines of the East and West change? What are the prospects for a nuclear-free world? Have the chances of a new war in Europe been ruled out? A contributor to this journal asked a number of participants in the seminar, immediately after its completion, to answer this and other questions. We are presenting an abridged record of the interviews and excerpts from some speeches.

From Positions of Neutrality

Lieutenant-General Karl Liko [name as transliterated], Austria

[PMS] Is a revolution under way in military doctrines of the East and West?

[Liko] Impetuous breakthroughs in the military and political sphere should hardly be expected. After so many years of confrontation and mutual fear, the old thinking is being overcome with great difficulty. Yet we have significantly advanced forward in understanding the reasons for our mutual distrust. This will undoubtedly have an effect upon the course of negotiations on conventional arms and measures for strengthening confidence and security which are being held in Vienna.

For example, the Eastern bloc expressed concern in connection with the presence of the NATO forces of forward basing. The West, in turn, sought an explanation for certain aspects of the military strategic concepts being adhered to by the USSR and allied states and was, in my opinion, offered sincere answers.

[PMS] How do you, as a representative of a neutral country, view attitudes of the superpowers?

[Liko] I am extremely glad that tension in the world has subsided, in many respects thanks to the efforts of the USSR and the United States, and I am proud of the fact that the first seminar in history in which high-ranking military leaders from 35 countries participated was held in my native country. We are also ready to assist in establishing contacts between those who previously belonged to hostile camps. I do not think that the role of an arbiter telling military alliances or superpowers what they should do is one which suits us. My impression is that the Western side does not always understand what is going on in the East and vice versa. However, on the whole, the situation is quite encouraging. It is as though the day is already breaking although the sun is not yet up.

[PMS] Don't you think that nuclear weapons should be totally eliminated in the interests of universal security?

[Liko] At our meeting we spoke mainly of conventional armaments, although the subject of nuclear ones, which present the most difficult problem, was also broached. It is believed in the West that the policy of nuclear deterrence, in one form or another, should not be abandoned. Some people also maintain that over many decades nuclear weapons have played an important role in maintaining peace, and that it is not desirable to leave them

completely out of our reckoning in the future, especially since there is no way back to "pre-nuclear chastity." It is a different matter that it might be useful to come to an understanding on the necessary quantity and distribution of nuclear means. This is a philosophical question and it will be the focus of peoples' attention for a long time to come. At the moment, however, I find it difficult to tell how it should be resolved, although my attitude toward the idea of building a nuclear-free world, advanced by M. Gorbachev, is one of interest. Generally speaking, we must be exceptionally grateful to this man who has given an impetus to so many changes in the world. Of course not only personalities make history, but he really is an outstanding figure. I am sure that even meetings similar to ours would not be possible without perestroika and new thinking.

[PMS] What is your assessment of the events in Panama at the end of the last year?

[Liko] I share the opinion of the Austrian Government which has stated that any forcible step with regard to a small country is illegal and inadmissible.

[PMS] In your opinion, have serious changes taken place in the Soviet Union's military policy as compared to the period when it was dominated by the "Brezhnev doctrine"?

[Liko] Yes, I believe that radical changes have taken place.

[PMS] What is your opinion of the German question to which, judging by historical experience, the people of your country are also far from indifferent?

[Liko] It is impossible to prevent unification of the German nation, and besides, we should not try to prevent it. However, 33 countries must participate in resolving this problem. This is not only a German question. In the given case the stake is really high—the security of a whole continent.

[PMS] What do you think is in store for us?

[Liko] It is difficult to tell. I was a soldier during World War II and experienced being close to death. For me, the fact that we in Europe have lived in peace for 45 years does not yet mean the absence of a military threat. I would like to believe that the negotiations which are under way in this building, the rapid and striking changes in East European countries, and the general course of events on our planet are leading to a strengthening of stability and security.

War Must Never Again Start From German Soil

Major General Hans-Werner Daim [name as transliterated], chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the National People's Army of the GDR.

[PMS] What are your main impressions of the meetings which have been concluded?

[Daim] Serious changes are taking place in military thinking. The era of secrecy is becoming a thing of the past. Purely military advantages are being rejected for the sake of universal security. Of course, whoever starts offensive operations first possesses an advantage because he himself determines the time, scale, place, and force of the strike. Nevertheless, we have only agreed to resort to retaliatory actions. Representatives of NATO, in particular those of the United States, have to admit: The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries no longer present a threat to them.

[PMS] Are your anxieties also abating accordingly?

[Daim] We continue to be worried about large-scale NATO exercises which greatly resemble the operational deployment of troops. These exercises sometimes involve more than one-half of all divisions of the first echelon and more than two-thirds of the tactical air force. Such situations are fraught with great dangers. We are also perplexed by the strengthening of the NATO alliance in central Europe.

[PMS] What are the specific features of the GDR's military doctrine as compared to those of other Warsaw Pact member countries?

[Daim] The main forces of NATO are concentrated in the immediate vicinity of our borders: the Northern Army Group and the greater part of the Central Group, as well as basic strategic reserves. The National People's Army of the GDR was created and developed as a coalition army. It operates jointly with the Soviet Western Group of Forces. In this connection, it would be absurd and irresponsible for us to echo our Czechoslovak friends' demand for a speedy withdrawal of the Soviet troops from our territory.

[PMS] However, such voices are being increasingly heard in your country too.

[Daim] I proceed from the assumption that the GDR will, for a certain period of time, exist as an independent state. In my opinion, unification of the two Germanies is only expedient within the framework of the development of the common European process. This is why I believe that the Western Group of Soviet Forces will be needed as long as American, British, and Belgian soldiers are stationed on the territory of the FRG.

[PMS] Do you rule out the possibility of becoming a Bundeswehr general and representing NATO in the case of German unification?

[Daim] Of course, speaking in abstract terms, everything is possible. However, I think that responsibility and reason will prevail. There exist four mighty powers which, in the interests of a guaranteed stability and security in Europe, should not allow a dangerous development of events to take place. For me, German unification is a historical prospect involving the disbandment of the two military blocs and the creation of a new

security system based on national armed forces which will only be necessary and sufficient for the defense of their own state territories.

[PMS] Are you not afraid, General, that the planet's demilitarization will narrow down that sphere to which you have devoted your life?

[Daim] I have already served for 38 years but I never had any desire to go to war. My goal is not to let a tragic absurdity happen, but to prevent a catastrophe. War is an immoral and criminal phenomenon and I am ready to sacrifice my career and rank at any moment for the sake of a lasting peace without weapons.

Admiral Dieter Wellershoff, chief of staff of the Bundeswehr.

The Federal Republic of Germany has learned its lessons from history. War must never again start from German soil.

Our situation at the heart of Europe and our aim of maintaining peace require close cooperation with our neighbors both in the East and the West. The legitimate interests and rights of every state in the sphere of security must be taken into account.

The planning and structure of the armed forces of NATO follow the guidelines of the strategy of "flexible response" to which the alliance adheres and to which we do not see any alternative in the foreseeable future. This strategy presupposes the existence of both conventional and nuclear forces.

The Anxieties and Hopes of the Superpowers

Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The reality is such that two military political alliances have generated an enormous mutual threat. In Europe, the opposing forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO number 3.5 million men each. Thousands of American nuclear missiles are aimed at targets within the USSR and about the same number of Soviet nuclear missiles at U.S. targets.

We are particularly alarmed by the powerful offensive capability of U.S. naval forces, by Washington's refusal to conduct any dialogue either on reducing the Navy or on eliminating naval tactical nuclear weapons. We regard this as a desire on the part of the United States, while negotiating with us the reduction of ground forces but at the same time carrying out the uncontrolled development of their naval forces, to achieve on this basis military superiority and to be able to put pressure on the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

We are concerned about the many hundreds of American military bases which, like a huge noose, surround the Soviet Union. They include groups of forces numbering 500,000 men and large air and naval forces. We have lived in this environment for more than 40 years. We are

well aware of the combat capabilities of the strategic air forces and the naval forces of the United States which have a great numerical superiority over the Soviet Navy. Add to this the "Star Wars" program which Washington is still unwilling to give up, the new strategic B-2 "Stealth bomber" which is a means for a first nuclear strike, the refusal to stop nuclear tests, and the stake on deterrence—on nuclear weapons.

Army General Colin Powell, chairman of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces.

We are encouraged by the reductions and withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and by Soviet declarations to the effect that the policy of coercion in the spirit of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" is a thing of the past.

President Bush has enunciated that the United States will proceed beyond the framework of deterrence policy. This is why we are taking part in the negotiations on reducing conventional armaments. This is why we are continuing and actually developing a trend toward lowering defense expenditure and reducing our Armed Forces.

The numerical strength of the American troops stationed in Europe is by no means inviolable. It has nowhere been carved in granite that military might in a divided Europe should be maintained at the same level as it has been over the past four decades.

We hope that the dream of a peaceful association of democratic countries which have common values, a dream which has been cherished both in the West and East, will become a reality.

Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[PMS] How do you assess the changes in the military doctrines of the West?

[Chervov] Representatives of NATO are asserting that their doctrines are defensive. One might assume that nobody is going to launch an attack and everybody is in favor of preventing war. However, the Western concept of "flexible response," for example, is based on resorting to a first nuclear strike which in itself points to its aggressive character. They [representatives of NATO] do not deny this. The progress here lies in the fact that the "cold war" concept of deterrence [ustrasheniye] has given way to the idea of minimum nuclear deterrence [yadernoye sderzhivaniye]. This is of no small importance, because a road is opening up for joint stage-by-stage progress toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

[PMS] What are the Soviet military giving up?

[Chervov] Starting from 1987, our military doctrine has been fully revised. Previously, we were accused of a lack

of correspondence between its military technical aspect and political declarations. Now there is no such contradiction.

The Soviet Union's military expenditure was fully disclosed at the seminar, and the dynamics of their future reduction were given. If the situation permits, we are going to sharply reduce—by a factor of between one and one-half and two—our defense expenditure as a share of national income by 1995. We are reducing our troops by 500,000 men and the structure of our Armed Forces is acquiring a strictly defensive character.

Soon after World War II, offensive operations were regarded as the main method of repulsing aggression. Later, our doctrine and strategy envisaged a combination of offensive and defensive means. At present, all the documents and rules unambiguously state the following: The main way to repel aggression is through defense. In conformity with this, strategic planning is being altered and the training of troops, commanders, and staffs is proceeding in a new way. Of course, it is not simple to restructure the minds of generals and officers.

Previously, rather large-scale exercises were conducted. We have now sharply reduced our military activity, conducting mainly regiment and battalion exercises, whereas those involving divisions occur only once every two years. In this connection we expressed a wish that the countries of NATO should also stop their "major maneuvers" which they conduct across a vast expanse from Norway to Turkey. We were promised, at least during talks in the lobby, that this concern of ours will be responded to.

Specific proposals on a significant reduction of military confrontation in Europe are also ensuing from our new military doctrine and general political course. The accord on conventional armaments which must be signed this year will significantly strengthen security on the continent.

[PMS] Nevertheless, the West continues to speak of the Warsaw Pact's "military superiority" which will prevail even following unilateral reductions in the Armed Forces.

[Chervov] We do not deny the fact that the Warsaw Pact has more tanks and tactical missiles. However, this is not its entire potential and it is far from being the main one. In terms of some components the advantage is on the side of the Warsaw Pact, whereas in terms of others it is on the side of NATO. For example, NATO is superior to the Warsaw Pact with regard to the quantity of strategic nuclear warheads, overall numerical strength—including reserve components—and the quantity of main types of combatant ships.

NATO has the advantage with regard to the production capacities of its defense industry and in terms of the overall military expenditure. Qualitative characteristics

of individual types of armaments and the state of the infrastructure are also assessed as being in NATO's favor.

It must also be kept in mind that the principal military disproportions in favor of the Warsaw Pact will be eliminated in accordance with the treaty on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

[PMS] Have the changes in East Europe not interfered with the spreading out of disarmament maps on the negotiating table? Is not the unity of the Warsaw Pact states under threat?

[Chervov] I do not think so. Bilateral meetings of the chiefs of the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries were held at the seminar. With the exception of General J. Uzycki of the Polish Armed Forces, all these are new people who have recently replaced the old leadership. As far as I am concerned, all of them have confirmed their allied obligations. Besides, in the course of the seminar itself, the national doctrines of the East European countries were presented taking account of the Warsaw Pact's obligations and military doctrine. This is, at least, how things stand today.

With regard to the other side, President G. Bush himself has declared that at present there is no threat from the East, and on the basis of this the U.S. military budget is being cut and proposals advanced on reducing the numerical strength of American and Soviet troops in central Europe to 195,000 men. Indeed, considerable problems arise in connection with prospects for the unification of the two Germanies. It goes without saying that nobody should interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. At the same time, the German question infringes upon the interests of at least the four states which signed the Potsdam agreements. We came to Europe not as beggars but as victors who had destroyed the Hitlerite hydra.

[PMS] There exists an opinion that the military are opponents of perestroika and of the new political thinking....

[Chervov] Such allegations are widespread in our press as well as in the Western press. However, serious processes of perestroika are also taking place in the Armed Forces. In connection with the reduction in the numerical strength of our Army and the withdrawal of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, quite a number of additional social problems undoubtedly arise which demand fast resolution, such as finding employment for those demobilized from the Army, providing them with housing, and so on. It is precisely this that certain forces opposed to perestroika are trying to exploit. However, this does not directly apply to the Army and the Armed Forces.

[PMS] Do you approach the 45th victory anniversary with a feeling that there will be no more need to go to war?

[Chervov] I very much hope that there will be no more wars, either nuclear or conventional. We have estimated that, even if only conventional weapons are used, the whole of Europe with its 200 nuclear power stations and numerous chemical enterprises will turn into radioactive ruins in 20 days. The threat is perfectly understood by all, and it is most doubtful that politicians would deliberately risk causing the end of the world. However, today's world lives in a situation in which the "mechanism of nuclear destruction" has been brought to perfection and may suddenly be put into action. This is extremely dangerous.

Soviet Fighter Bombers Stationed on Kola

90EN0685A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
15 Jun 90 p 20

[Article by Gunn Gravdal: "Soviet Fighters on Kola"]

[Text] For the first time, Soviet fighter planes have been stationed on the Kola Peninsula. The main task of these planes is to attack targets from the rear, and their range makes it possible for them to reach targets through North Norway from bases on the Kola Peninsula. Defense Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen, speaking at a security policy seminar in Bergen last Thursday, presented this information on recent changes in military strength on the Kola Peninsula. A Soviet fighter bomber regiment previously stationed in Debrecen, Hungary, was withdrawn to the Soviet Union as part of an agreement stating that all Soviet troops would be removed from Hungary and the CSFR within one year. During the withdrawal, it was stated that the regiment would be transferred to the North Fleet in the Murmansk region, near the Norwegian-Soviet border.

The approximately 40 fighter bombers of the MiG-27 type, also known as Flogger 7, possess nuclear capabilities and have not been stationed on the Kola Peninsula in the past.

During the seminar in Bergen, the defense minister stated that in recent months the Norwegian military had repeatedly spotted the new planes on the Kola. The fighter bomber regiment represents a marked increase in the offensive capabilities of the air force.

"The major regroupings and withdrawals of Soviet military troops from Central Europe may result in a change in the balance of military strength on the flanks. This emphasizes the view that Norway has stated at NATO, namely that security and disarmament in Europe must be based on the concept of the strategic unity of the alliance. Arms reductions in Central Europe must not lead to a military buildup on the flanks," Per Ditlev-Simonsen stressed.

Need for European Security Doctrine Seen

PM2806140990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun
90 Second Edition p 7

[Tomas Kolesnichenko "View From Moscow": "Rough Draft of a Doctrine"]

[Text] I could, of course, pick one of Marx' theses on Feuerbach and claim that it is necessary not to explain the world but to remake it. But it is better when these two processes are somehow synchronized. It is necessary to have a clear idea of the consequences resulting from a particular remaking of the world. Otherwise chaos could ensue.

The stormy events or, more accurately, the 1989 revolutions in East Europe have "remade" the political and social structure of a sizable part of our continent and, if you bear in mind their influence on geopolitics, of the whole of Europe. To what does this lead?

This is not so much a philosophical as a practical question. For not only the former regimes but also the entire security system that had taken shape in Europe after World War II found themselves overthrown as a result of these "gentle," "velvet," "peaceful" revolutions—call them what you will, but they were precisely revolutions.

Poor though it may have been, that system ensured peace and stability on the European Continent and beyond its borders. Its basic component was the strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In recent years it was reinforced by the Helsinki process and by the transformation of the CSCE into an institution for strengthening European security.

Now a vacuum is arising, and this is always dangerous for nature abhors a vacuum. And a great deal, a very great deal now depends on the substance which will fill the new structures of security and mutual understanding between East and West. Even though these concepts are now regaining their purely "geographic" meaning, we must not forget Kipling: "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet...."

I will begin with what, from my viewpoint, should not be done and which leads to dangerous destabilization. This means, above all, trying to score "bloc" points out of the situation that has come about: Let us say, to strengthen NATO against the background of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact's military structure. Nor, of course, should an attempt be made to integrate Germany posthaste into NATO's military structure while disregarding the security of other European states. All these are axioms about which much has already been written and said. However, neither the NATO Council session at foreign minister level held recently in the Scottish town of Turnberry, nor the statements by that bloc's leaders on the eve of the London summit meeting, make this question any clearer.

What is more, despite the general phrases about "the prospects for ending East-West confrontation" and the

other constructive rhetoric, as it were, NATO strategists intend (at any rate for the immediate future) to preserve the bloc's basic military doctrines. These include "deterrence," "flexible response," the "first strike," "follow-on forces attack" strategy, and others. They do not even wish to forgo the plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons.

As a result, the Warsaw Pact appeal to put the bloc's political functions in first place instead of their military functions has not yet received clear-cut support, although M. Thatcher, for example, who advocates "preserving the reliable defense" of the West, recognizes that "it is necessary to examine how to widen NATO's role from the prevention of war to the building of peace."

And here a sacramental question, to put it bluntly, arises: Why is it necessary to build a new security system on a NATO basis or on a bloc basis at all? Why must precisely NATO, as Thatcher also asserts, be "turned into a forum of transatlantic dialogue"?

Maybe because the Warsaw Pact is disintegrating and the "victory" is NATO's? First, the NATO bloc has not won. It is very important to state that it certainly was not the "position of strength" policy, which the United States and the NATO countries regarded as of paramount importance, that led to the historic changes in East Europe. They were made possible above all as a result of realizing the policy of new thinking. It was this, in the end, that "took by storm" the Berlin Wall. Any other storming would have ended in universal catastrophe. Therefore it is possible, I believe, to draw this conclusion: The danger of war in Europe has been reduced to a minimum. The relationship of "alliance" between the USSR and the countries of East Europe is getting its "second wind" on the basis of the development now of fully mutual advantageous economic and trade ties.

Second, NATO remains a military bloc however its facade is camouflaged, and the heavy "burden" of NATO military doctrines will continue to strongly dominate the bloc's political line and limit its effectiveness.

At the same time, institutions free of the military burden have now appeared in the European arena and are strengthening. As THE NEW YORK TIMES rightly pointed out recently, "NATO's enemy—the Warsaw Pact—is vanishing, but a very serious rival has emerged—the CSCE."

The concept of "doctrine" has recently once again become fashionable. Why not create a "new Europe doctrine" on the basis of the CSCE? And found it on the principle of equal security, trust, cooperation, and observance of mutual interests.

The essence of this doctrine (it could also be called something else) consists in replacing the bloc military structure with a fundamentally different system whose security would be founded not on military confrontation, not even on a balance or parity of forces, but on

very broad and diverse cooperation. The interests of "Atlantic solidarity" would also be observed here for the United States and Canada are actively involved in the CSCE process. Indeed, why strengthen NATO if there is no threat? Why gamble on a military bloc when it is necessary to set in motion quite different functions as far removed from a "first strike" as the sky is from the earth?

I would like especially to point out one circumstance: Those people in the United States, or in the West in general, who are nonetheless thinking of destabilizing the international situation, nurturing plans to preserve NATO as the sole guarantor of European security, are playing with fire. In a situation when the "cold war" has been buried and the danger of a clash between the USSR and the United States is at its lowest point since World War II, the self-assertion of NATO without even abandoning the "first strike" doctrine can only be regarded as a challenge to the Soviet Union. And whether or not NATO wants this—I believe it does not—all this will look like a threat to the USSR's security. A counterreaction is perfectly possible, for this would be a kind of "gift" to some people. They would include those who will demand, as happened a few days ago, that we not surrender "without a fight." Moreover, they might propose "catching up with and overtaking" NATO. Well, we are able to catch up militarily and achieve parity, although once again all this will not cost a mere kopek but billions of rubles. It will also entail big military spending for the NATO countries, bringing no one genuine security but merely initiating a new spiral of the arms race.

The doctrine of a united Europe must be founded not on a narrow national or state basis but on an all-European one. It would absorb the "common European home" of M.S. Gorbachev, the "integral and free Europe" of G. Bush, and the "all-European confederation" of F. Mitterrand. Its economic and social basis could be made up both of a "common market" from the Atlantic to the Urals and of the Delors plan for European integration—the united Europe plan.

The status of the future united Germany must be the core of the new doctrine. Our position as a whole has already been expressed repeatedly. Two days ago the Soviet delegation at the talks within the framework of the "two-plus-four" mechanism submitted for consideration a draft document based on a comprehensive approach to settling foreign policy aspects of German unity. The main points in the definitive settlement of this problem include, once again, its synchronization with the Helsinki process as the chief factor of stability in Europe. The "ball" is now in "their" court, as the saying goes. But even now I will note an important dynamic in the way this problem is formulated. Only a while ago we heard a stubborn "no" from the West when there was talk of any international status for Germany other than its integration in the NATO system.

Today a pluralism of opinions is "in evidence," as it were. The Hamburg Institute of Problems of Peace, for example, has reached the conclusion that certain models of Germany's future hardly meet the demands of a European security system. "The version involving Germany's NATO membership is a solution from yesterday, while the second version—its neutralization—is from the day before yesterday," the authors of a special study write. Their conclusion is that it is necessary to combine two aspects: the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe which could be "the nucleus for the creation of a nonbloc, permanently functioning organ of European security."

Unfortunately, diplomats and politicians—even those whose business cards begin with the words "Doctor of Sciences"—are lagging behind scientists in their conclusions. But time is pressing. The NATO leaders will gather in London in the very near future, and they have to state, one way or another, their position both on the German question and on Europe's future security system.

It is no secret that "they" too are now elaborating new doctrines. It is important to make positions closer. For this painstaking and in many respects still rough work is needed. But if the longest journeys begin with the first step, all "doctrines" begin with rough drafts.

Article Urges Change in U.S. Strategy

PM0207132590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Observer Aleksandr Golts article under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Time To Change Strategy"]

[Text] As the U.S. press reports, tense "summit meetings" are now going on in Washington. And though these talks are not being held with representatives from foreign countries, but between leaders of the administration and Congress leaders, they are not progressing with ease. After all, their subject is the country's budget for fiscal 1991. The White House is sparing no efforts in defending the government programs from the merciless knife of the legislators, who have conceived the idea of balancing the budget by cutting federal expenditure.

This would seem to be an exclusively domestic matter, and does this topic merit much attention? I think it does. The echo of the current budget storms across the ocean may reverberate on this side of the Atlantic and around the planet as a whole. It is no secret that a significant part of federal expenditure goes on military spending. It is this that is the chief cause of everyone's anxiety.

The disputes in the United States are going on not only over the military budget figure, but also over the Armed Forces' structure, and consequently also over plans for their future development. Thus, assessing the Pentagon's

draft budget, L. Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, stated bluntly that it is based on outdated assessments which do not reflect the improvements in relations between the USSR and the United States.

Simultaneously the administration has to repel an attack on another front—from the conservatives. Those on the right wing claim that, having signed the document on agreed positions on reducing strategic offensive arms with the USSR president, G. Bush has all but betrayed national interests. The topic of strategic offensive arms, incidentally, is never out of U.S. newspapers, which cannot be said of our press. After a brief conceptual analysis in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the Supreme Soviet, the strategic offensive arms problems have practically not been discussed, crowded out by stormy internal political events.

As for representatives of the U.S. Administration, then, speaking both in Congress and the press, they never tire of proving that the future treaty is advantageous to the United States. Thus, the secretary of state bluntly stressed that this treaty "is built on American conceptions and American proposals." He considers it one of the most important achievements that in accordance with the arrangement Soviet "heavy" missiles, which caused most anxiety to the U.S. side, will be reduced by half. In the secretary of state's interpretation restrictions which do not affect a single type of U.S. weapon are extending to these particular missiles.

U.S. experts also treat the rules for counting sea- and air-launched cruise missiles as a success. After all, they afford Washington the opportunity of having 800-900 missiles more. On this point, if I understand the situation correctly, in reality this gap might be greater. For example, a limit of 880 units has been fixed for sea-launched cruise missiles. The American program for this type of weapon has long been under way. The U.S. Navy already has almost one-half of the number mentioned. While the Soviet Union has no such missiles. That is, the USSR will face a choice: To spend considerable resources on developing systems analogous to the Americans', or asymmetrical to them, or to agree to a numerical superiority on the U.S. side.

In conditions when even after reductions both sides will retain a nuclear potential capable of destroying all life on the planet many times over, such an imbalance, as I see it, might be acceptable. At the same time, unequal reductions from the numerical viewpoint must not lead to qualitative changes. Parity must not be violated. Moreover, in such a situation it appears natural for the SALT I Treaty to become the prologue to an agreement on even deeper cuts in nuclear forces, during which the imbalances outlined would be evened out.

The United States' actions in the transitional period acquire particular importance in my view. Just now it would be sensible for our partners to conduct affairs in

such a way that Moscow has no fears that Washington intends to turn a possible numerical inequality to its advantage.

In this connection Washington's views on the U.S. Armed Forces' future are of considerable interest. Let me say in all fairness that the military department too is having to reckon with the rapid changes in the world arena. Thus, Secretary of Defense R. Cheney has had to review proposals for military expenditure three times. At the present time a long-term plan of military construction has been devised as a result of consultations with senior generals and secretaries of the Air Force, Navy, and Army. It provides for, specifically, a 25 percent reduction in the U.S. Armed Forces in the period 1992 through 1997. According to U.S. press reports, its thrust is a decrease in the number of personnel by 442,000 servicemen. The Pentagon proposes to disband six regular divisions of ground forces and marines and four reserve divisions. The Pentagon considers it possible to decrease the number of Navy ships from 566 to 455. It is also proposed to disband 11 tactical wings and four squadrons of strategic aviation.

True, at a press conference the secretary pointed out that this project, prepared at the request of legislators, should be considered as an "illustration" of possible Armed Forces reductions and by no means as new administration proposals on the military budget. Let us note here that this plan in no way affects existing modernization programs for U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

According to press data, the Pentagon has agreed to decrease the number of B-2 "Stealth" strategic bombers only slightly. The cost of this bomber has exceeded the most fantastic forecasts. (However, General J. Chain, commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Air Command, does not agree with this. He thinks that the B-2 will become "a central element of nuclear deterrence in tomorrow's world").

At the same time, American strategists do not intend, it seems, to scrap plans to develop the "Midgetman" mobile missile and to deploy MX missiles in the future. Moreover, even in budget reduction conditions, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY magazine reports, the Navy command intends, after three years' dithering, to carry out the program for purchasing "Tomahawk" cruise missiles. Simultaneously modernization work on them will be carried out.

And by the end of the century the Navy Department intends to deliver into service yet another generation of nuclear missile weapons of this type. As THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR testifies, at the present time work is in full swing on the elaboration of a cruise missile incorporating the "Stealth" technology, capable, moreover, of moving at supersonic speed. It is not the only forward-looking project in the sphere of nuclear missile weapons. But I have deliberately dwelled on plans connected with cruise missiles. If the projects are

really as the American press reports them, then it signifies that the Pentagon intends to strengthen whatever advantage it might get from the SALT Treaty from the qualitative standpoint, too.

Finally, what Washington has again started saying about the SDI makes us cautious. The other day the secretary of defense gave his assurance that this "star wars" program will remain inviolable under any reductions. And he backed this up with the fact that it is the SDI which must prevent an attack on the United States... from the developing states. It is very doubtful whether a program of developing space weapons is just the sort of resource that a great power must use in order to remove the threat of attack from developing countries. It is more likely that SDI, implemented in conditions of large-scale reductions of strategic offensive arms, is regarded by the Pentagon as an important component of U.S. military strikepower.

However, these programs, on which the Pentagon is insisting, by no means strike the imagination. In the years of confrontation we saw projects which were a bit more biting. So why do they cause anxiety? Merely because right now Moscow expects different approaches from Washington.

As was said way centuries ago, "an age, having changed its customs, begs a different style." And, in switching from confrontation to cooperation, it is of course time for the United States to change the style of its military policy. And this must be done primarily so that no military programs, perhaps implemented only by militarist inertia, break such a delicate thread of mutual trust. It is this trust which is a guarantee that cooperation to free the planet of a terrible threat will be continued in the future.

Troop Pullout From Czechoslovakia Encounters Difficulties

Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Visit

*PM2806132990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Jun 90 First Edition p 3*

[Report by special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Belousov: "Fruitful Dialogues"]

[Text] Central Group of Forces, 26 June—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia is causing many problems, among which the property and financial problem is one of the most complex.

It was to the search for ways of resolving property and financial questions that much attention was devoted at the Central Group Military Council's meeting with members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions who were visiting Czechoslovakia. Colonel General E. Vorobyev, the USSR Government's plenipotentiary for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal

Republic] territory and commander of the Central Group of Forces, and Major General N. Plyaskin, first deputy chief of the Central Group of Forces Political Directorate, raised in particular the question of setting up under the USSR Government's plenipotentiary a standing bureau (department) of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations for the sale of the Defense Ministry's property and real estate.

The conversation begun at the Military Council was continued in the Soviet Embassy in Prague, where USSR Ambassador to the CSFR B. Pankin and M. Kuznetsov, embassy minister-counselor, received the Soviet parliamentarians and representatives of the Central Group of Forces command.

Then they held a meeting with representatives of the mass media. Czechoslovak journalists were especially interested in whether the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be changed in view of the difficulties on the Soviet side. USSR People's Deputies V. Ochirov, B. Vare, M. Zokirov, V. Opolinskiy, and B. Podziruk stressed in their replies to the questions that there is no question of a change in the timetable, but the dynamics of financial and economic settlements must be transformed.

On the same day talks were held between Soviet parliamentarians and CSFR Federal Assembly Deputy M. Kocab, Major General S. Nadovic, chief of the administration for supporting the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Major General V. Poltikovic, his deputy, and Doctor B. Koteny. This meeting can be called a fruitful one. Earlier Soviet and Czechoslovak experts had already reached a common method of assessing the value of facilities and now new opportunities arose in the solution of financial and economic problems. M. Kocab spoke of his intention to promote the delivery of portable housing to the Soviet Union to accommodate 100,000 members of the families of servicemen leaving Czechoslovakia.

Visit Reveals Many Problems

*PM2806143190 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Jun 90*

[Report by S. Andreyev and V. Lebedev, identified by caption; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Newscaster] A group of USSR people's deputies who are members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Questions is visiting Czechoslovakia to familiarize itself with the process of the Soviet troop withdrawal and problems connected with this operation.

[Correspondent] The problems are many, and the deputies addressed one of the main ones during their meeting with journalists.

Many of the officers' and warrant officers' families will have nowhere to live on their return home. Houses were

built for them abroad but not at home. It seems to me that a question which should have been asked has not been asked. Did it not occur to anyone during the more than 20 years of the troops' temporary stay abroad that one day they would have to return home?

There are many things here that seem incomprehensible. This probably explains the tone of the local press coverage of the troop withdrawal, which is neutral at best, but more often than not negative. These are Czechoslovak television pictures. People cannot understand how it is possible to let buildings, including housing, fall into such neglect. [video shows interior of dirty, dilapidated building] How it is possible to leave toys like this in the earth [video shows land mines], even if these mines are just training mines. How it is possible to allow three meter thick strata of petroleum products to accumulate in the earth. [video shows diggers, trench filled with thick black liquid] You could almost start pumping petroleum here. Not just the Army, but our nationwide ecological blindness is probably to blame for this. Perhaps it was not even the Soviet units which created these underground petroleum lakes here. It has emerged that back in 1968, 1969, and 1970 when we leased these facilities, no ecological survey was carried out. A joint scientific commission is now to be set up which will determine the share of responsibility and the damage caused. Compensation will have to be paid. Questions of payment for facilities leased from the Czechoslovak side and installations built by the Soviet side have also yet to be decided.

Recently Czechoslovak television carried a feature on the excellent state of a settlement vacated by a special purpose unit on the border with the FRG. The housing may be turned into a small hotel. [video shows premises in good repair] It appears that it is also possible to leave in a civilized fashion.

Problems Beset Troop Withdrawal From Hungary

*PM2806133590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent F. Lukyanov: "Considering Both Sides' Interests"]

[Text] Budapest—The final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, which began in March, is entering its most strenuous phase. Before the end of this year the bulk of our troops' personnel and arms is to be withdrawn. A group of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by V.N. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, arrived in Hungary recently to familiarize itself with how things are going with regard to the return home of the units of the Southern Group of Forces.

On Hungarian territory there remains the Soviet Army's immovable property assessed at a total of R2.8 million, ultimately paid for by the Soviet taxpayers. It is on this question that the positions of the Soviet and Hungarian

sides are so far furthest apart. The thrust of the Hungarian position is, and this has been stated frequently officially, that during their stay on Hungarian territory the Soviet units caused considerable harm to the environment and took a considerable quantity of arable land out of circulation while the buildings left behind by our army, including 363 apartment blocks with 14,000 apartments, schools, and hospitals are not of the slightest value to the Hungarian side. That is why they believe the sides are quits.

This way of putting the question can probably be understood but hardly accepted. Many of the establishments which are being left behind were once constructed according to Hungarian plans using Hungarian construction materials and it is hardly right to say they are not of the slightest value to the Hungarians. The Soviet side, where necessary and possible, is setting about recultivating the land taken out of circulation and where that is not possible is agreeing to compensation. As for the buildings and installations, serious interest is being displayed by a whole series of firms and enterprises in the establishments left behind. To this must be added that Hungary's mass media sometimes give very one-sided coverage to problems connected with the property disputes which have arisen which, incidentally, has frequently generated protests from the Soviet military command.

The point is that very often the military establishments left behind by our troops are turned within a few days into something unrecognizable, which is then recorded by the local press and submitted as "the work of Soviet soldiers." Thus, the military township around the airfield in Debrecen was attacked by people who like "easy pickings" literally the day after the withdrawal of the Soviet air force regiment.

All these problems which have arisen during the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Hungary were discussed at the meeting of the USSR people's deputies with the command of the Southern Group of Forces headed by Colonel General M.P. Burlakov. The deputies displayed a lively interest in the reasons for the situation which has taken shape. In response, the command cited the insufficient legal elaboration of the articles of the intergovernment agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops regarding property questions, which gives grounds for contradictory interpretations of particular provisions. Obviously it was proposed to resolve property disputes within the working procedure but the Hungarian side's positions proved tougher than had been supposed. Ultimately, as the participants in the meeting in the Southern Group of Forces admitted, there is now a threat to Soviet property, which may remain in Hungary either completely free of charge or else for minimum compensation. I think, however, that the time of generous gifts to anyone has passed. Particularly in a situation when the Soviet Army units returning to the motherland are, when they are redeployed, encountering problems like the lack of housing, schools, and construction materials. Under these conditions compensation for

the immovable property left behind in Hungary could be used to purchase the necessary construction materials and equipment here.

Both the deputies and the troops command recognized that the critical situation cannot fail to worry us. To be fair it must be said that recently certain advances have nonetheless been noted here. For instance, a commission of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical supply was created recently and has begun work with the participation of professional lawyers and economists and will undertake the examination of property problems, thus freeing the military of functions which are not theirs. Quite a few options have also already emerged for the further use of property, including through joint ventures. I want to hope that the commission which has been created will be able to cope with the solution of the problems which have emerged. The USSR people's deputies have promised to help its work. The deputies have promised to promote the solution of the difficulties emerging in the places where our units are being redeployed.

Of course, much will depend on the constructive approach of the Hungarian authorities. It is clear that the solution to the problem is possible only with an unfailing consideration of the interests of both sides, because a one-sided approach, which threatens to jeopardize the schedule for the Soviet troops' withdrawal, hardly accords with the interests of either side.

Research Center Cites USSR Strategic Changes

*LD2806100890 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington, June 28 (TASS)—The central link of strategic changes in East Europe is formed by the Soviet Union's unilateral measures to cut its armed forces, specialists of the Centre for Defence Information, a prestigious Washington research organisation, have concluded.

Their report released here says the Soviet Union is taking active steps to modify its military doctrine and policy as well as the structure of its armed forces in order to make them consistent with the reasonable sufficiency principle. This is illustrated by the reduction of Soviet defence spending and military production and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries.

Given these fundamental changes overturning all earlier American ideas concerning the nature of threat to U.S. national security, the report stresses, the Bush administration should splash the American presence in Europe and agree to the Soviet proposal to withdraw all foreign troops from the region by 1995.

At present, the United States maintains a total of 336,000 troops armed with the latest weapons and about 3,700 units of short range nuclear arms in Western

Europe. The upkeep of these servicemen and their families costs the American taxpayer 160-170 billion dollars annually, which is more than all America's NATO allies in Western Europe taken together allocate for military purposes.

At the same time, the centre's director, retired Rear-Admiral Gene Larocque told TASS, the American economy badly needs the money spent on American troops in Europe. This money could best be used to cover the U.S. federal budget deficit, or to pay for the most acute urgent social programmes, including above all the building of housing for the homeless, the anti-drug campaign and the reconstruction of old bridges and roads.

In this respect, the Bush administration's proposals to cut conventional arms in Europe appear to be worse than insufficient, as more than 260,000 American troops will remain in the region even after the proposed measures are implemented.

The cold war is over, the U.S. rear admiral stressed. After wars end, troops return home. The new international security climate, created mainly by the Soviet Union's efforts, enables the United States to cut considerably its military presence in foreign countries. In this connection, Europe appears to be the most suitable place to begin, he said.

Safety Worries Rise Over Scrapping Nuclear Subs

PM0207122790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Rear Admiral D. Alpatov, deputy chief of the Navy's Main Directorate for Operations and Overhauls, by own correspondent Captain First Class A. Pilipchuk; first paragraph is editorial introduction; place and date unspecified: "Where To 'Bury' Nuclear Ships"]

[Text] As has been reported in the press, the public in the city of Sovetskaya Gavan and the settlement of Vanino has protested the work in Postovaya Bay on the reactors of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Numerous telegrams to the USSR president, the country's Supreme Soviet, the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies, the Defense Ministry, and the Navy commander in chief, categorically demanding a complete ban on the work have arrived from the Far Eastern region. Just what is the threat to the people of the Far East? That was the first question to Rear Adm. D. Alpatov, deputy chief of the Navy's Main Directorate for Operations and Overhauls.

[Alpatov] Some of the mass media, in covering what has happened, have used a number of incompetent judgments liable to whip up feelings. One article talked about the military department's desire to turn Postovaya Bay into a "carving plate." Another article claimed that "work to dismantle power plants" was planned. Neither of these is true. But the idea was planted. Behind each of

these frightening terms people saw a danger where none really existed. In this instance we are only talking about removing reactor cores from two decommissioned nuclear ships and putting them aboard a technical support ship. It should be stressed that this will only increase the radiation and nuclear safety of ships standing at their moorings. These operations are not only carried out on decommissioned submarines. Each nuclear ship, from the moment it is launched until the time it is decommissioned, is repeatedly "refueled" with nuclear fuel. This work has been carried out for more than 30 years at ship repair enterprises or in the nuclear submarines' area of deployment. And practice convinces us that the operation is safe enough provided the technology is strictly monitored.

[Pilipchuk] And where are the decommissioned submarines we are talking about "registered"?

[Alpatov] In Postovaya Bay. Incidentally, the areas in which nuclear submarines are based are dictated by the state's security interests and are determined by government resolution. Documents defining the procedure for work in the Navy with radioactive materials have been elaborated in accordance with basic all-Union sanitary regulations and radiation safety norms. In this connection the claim made by one newspaper about the "ecological extraterritoriality" of the military is confusing. We are prepared to ensure that there is full glasnost as regards work with radioactive substances.

[Pilipchuk] Nonetheless, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, people cannot fail to ask the following question: Today we're talking about two submarines in Sovetskaya Gavan, tomorrow there will be more than twice as many, and the day after tomorrow—as part of the arms reduction process—the number of decommissioned nuclear submarines could rise many times over. What is the procedure for scrapping them?

[Alpatov] It was laid down in 1986 by a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution—incidentally, it also covers nuclear-powered Ministry of the Maritime Fleet ships—and it has not been broken in this instance. But, in my view, the resolution does not yet ensure an appropriate material basis for working with a large number of ships. When the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet building program was being implemented, it was closely scrutinized by the government. But today, it seems, the problem of the mass decommissioning of nuclear-powered naval ships and their utilization have been classed as departmental problems for the Navy.

[Pilipchuk] What brings you to that conclusion?

[Alpatov] I will mention the most substantive point. The Navy command proposed that the USSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry, and the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations set up a single sector (or firm) to collect, stockpile, and process radioactive waste and to develop with the help of big-league science the modern technology and base

required to utilize ships and vessels with nuclear power plants. However, we were refused: It was thought that there was not a problem. And if there's no problem there's no money. Today it seems that the situation is changing for the better. Not so long ago V. Konovalov, minister of nuclear power generation and the nuclear industry, expressed the idea in a PRAVDA article that a corresponding state program was needed. I would go further: We need a Union law.

[Pilipchuk] Incidentally, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was the first to raise the question of the need for a fundamental solution to this problem¹ Does the problem exist in the U.S., British, French, or Canadian Navies?

[Alpatov] All naval powers with nuclear submarines have similar problems. Only the United States, as far as I am aware, has experience of burying submarines' reactor compartments. In my view, there is a need for an international exchange of experience on the mass decommissioning of nuclear submarines from navies. This would be a logical continuation of the joint efforts to cut armaments.

[Pilipchuk] One last question. In covering events in the Far East, one newspaper called naval seamen "bureaucratic optimists." What's your attitude to that?

[Alpatov] Our optimism is by no means explained by a bureaucratic approach to the job. It is based on our great experiencing of operating nuclear power plants, our sense of responsibility, the men's level of training, and our multilayered and constant monitoring of the radiation situation. As you will understand, for us this is a question of the security of the crew members of nuclear ships and of their families living in the garrisons.

Footnotes

1. The article "Nuclear Submarines on the Scrapheap?" of 6 April this year.

'International Situation' on START Problems

LD2906205790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0930 GMT 29 Jun 90

["International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov, all-Union radio commentator on foreign politics, with Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, TASS observer on military matters; Viktor Levin, commentator; and Sergey Pravdin, commentator]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Ptashnikov] Now, as I promised, let us talk about disarmament problems, about what positive things were achieved in this field in the course of the latest Soviet-American summit meeting. The only difficulty is that it is simply impossible to give a detailed account of all issues in the reduction of military arsenals in a single program. Therefore, we shall dwell just on strategic offensive weapons

today. Since we obviously cannot manage without a specialist's opinion here, I have invited Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, the TASS observer on military matters—whom I think you already know, comrades—into the studio.

[Passage omitted] [Ptashnikov] All the same, as far as I understood, not all issues connected with the future treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons have yet been resolved. What problems still remain?

[Chernyshev] Unfortunately, you are right. There are still some obstacles on the way to the signing of the treaty. This means, primarily, the problem of testing heavy missiles. The United States does not have such missiles, but we do: 308 SS-18 missiles, so called according to the U.S. interpretation. We have expressed a readiness to reduce their numbers by a half, to 154, but we want to reserve the right to perform test launches of them. But the United States objects to that. Evidently, there is something here for both the Soviet and U.S. specialists and academics to ponder: to define where the permissible limit to modernization lies, and where a qualitative arms race might begin.

The second problem is that the United States is trying, figuratively speaking, to sell the same cow twice over. On its insistence, the Soviet medium-range bomber Tu-22M, or Backfire in their code, has been included as a subject for the negotiations on conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which are currently in progress in Vienna. But Washington is trying to include it in the category of strategic weapons as well, meaning that we are supposed to take it into account twice. After all, the Soviet Union declared back in 1979 that it would not give that aircraft the properties of inter-continental range, so it cannot be put in the strategic category. Our country is prepared to confirm that obligation today too, but no more than that.

Finally, the problem of nonevasion of the treaty remains unresolved. The United States claims that it has a cooperation program in Great Britain, under which it can give London any types of strategic weaponry: sea-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental missiles, cruise missiles, and so on. But that makes the whole treaty meaningless. What do reductions in U.S. arms change if they are handed over to the British? Now, when the main provisions of the treaty have been fixed and the USSR and the United States are aiming to sign it by the end of this year, the question of the British and French nuclear forces naturally arises. In these conditions, the U.S. formula—to hand over nuclear weapons and the means for modernizing them to the British without restriction—is, of course, totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Thus, as you see, fairly serious issues remain, but solutions can be found to them as well.

[Ptashnikov] Well, let us hope so. Thank you, Vladimir Nikolayevich. [passage omitted]

Vienna Talks 'Success' on Armor Numbers Reported

PM0307091590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Jun 90 Second Edition p 7

[Report by own correspondent I. Melnikov: "Path to a Solution"]

[Text] Vienna, 29 June—Last Wednesday there was a great sigh of relief in the Hofburg Palace: The elaboration of reduction levels for tanks and armored vehicles was completed! This important event did not even take place at a plenary meeting of the Vienna talks, but at a modest session of experts. However, the accredited correspondents reacted immediately—now one can definitely say that there has been a powerful burst of speed at the talks.

What is the nature of the success?

The reduction levels were agreed as a result of discussions in working groups. For example, on tanks—perhaps the hardest nut to crack at the talks—it was decided that each alliance, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, should have no more than 20,000. This figure covers all tracked and wheeled tanks weighing 16.5 tonnes and over.

Armored vehicles (they include armed equipment weighing less than 16.5 tonnes) are divided into three groups—infantry fighting vehicles, armored carriers, and heavily armed armored vehicles. Each alliance would be able to have no more than 30,000 vehicles, and levels have been set for each group of equipment.

The path to a solution was not easy. It came about as a result of long and complex discussions and balanced consideration of the security of East and West. The summit talks in Washington were of paramount significance in terms of finding a compromise, by stating that a draft treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces would be ready by the fall.

Yazov Quizzed on Troop Withdrawal Problems

PM0107182990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Litovkin; place, date not given: "Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov: Society Should Be Concerned About the Army"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR defense minister, answers questions from our military correspondent on how the problems of the withdrawal, settlement [obustroystvo], and social protection of troops returning home from abroad are being resolved.

[Litovkin] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, how many troops and how much equipment has currently been withdrawn from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, and Mongolia?

[Yazov] If we take into account those units we are unilaterally cutting—and you know that we made this decision two years ago—and units that are to be redeployed, the figures look as follows. Last year more than 27,000 men, 2,700 tanks, and 310 aircraft were withdrawn from GDR territory. The process of Army reduction continues.

This year more than 43,000 men, 900 tanks, more than 680 artillery systems, and 52 warplanes have been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

More than 16,000 servicemen and more than 470 tanks, 360 artillery systems, and 121 aircraft have been withdrawn from Mongolia.

What lies behind these indicators? First, they are proof that we are scrupulously and honestly carrying out our commitments: The troop withdrawal is proceeding strictly to the agreed schedule. Second, we are showing in practice our adherence to the new defensive doctrine and the principle of defense sufficiency. After all, the Armed Forces cuts, the partial redeployment of military units, the alteration of their sphere of specialization, and the creation of defensive groupings were envisioned precisely by this doctrine and by the concept of military reform.

[Litovkin] In what parts of the country are the withdrawn units being stationed? Why in those places in particular rather than any others? What considerations were decisive for the Defense Ministry in reaching this decision—strategic expediency or the need to rapidly solve the problems that emerged?

[Yazov] We proceeded on the basis of the need to solve a range of problems. Of course, operational and strategic considerations had to take priority: We had to deploy troops so as to ensure that in the event of, for instance, aggression against Soviet territory, they would be able to carry out their defensive mission successfully. Moreover, it was necessary to take account of the questions of the troops' everyday activity.

I'm not revealing any great military secret if I say that, in elaborating the options for the new deployments, we deliberately gave the strategic aspects a back seat. We gave priority to people's interests and the economic and sociopolitical situation in the country. We thought not only of how and where to build housing, but of whether certain regions had a developed industrial and social base. We need to find work for the wives of officers and warrant officers, to create opportunities for the children to have a full education, and to find places in kindergartens....

We discussed all the pros and cons at the Defense Ministry, in the government, the USSR Supreme Soviet,

and at the Defense Council with the president's participation. The choice fell to the country's central regions, its European region. Divisions of the Central Group of Forces, for instance, will go to the Moscow Military District—Gorkiy, Sormovo, Kursk, and Shuya—the Baltic Military District, and the cities of Kaliningrad Oblast. The famous Irkutsk-Pinsk Order of Lenin and Order of the October Revolution Three Times Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division will go to Belorussia, which it liberated during the year....

Most Southern Group units will also go to Belorussia and the Ukraine, near Lugansk, Cherkassy, and Dnepropetrovsk.... Divisions from Mongolia will be deployed within the borders of the Transbaykal Military District. Except that individual units—this applies above all to aviation—will be sent to the North, Siberia, and Turkestan.

[Litovkin] Why this injustice toward pilots? I know a helicopter regiment. It fought in Afghanistan. Then it spent just over a year in Hungary, and now it's going back to difficult conditions in the Turkestan Military District.

[Yazov] Almost all helicopter units visited Afghanistan. How could we determine who should serve in a hot climate and who should be "spared?" How could we determine the fairness? On the other hand, Turkestan, the Far East, and the Far North are all rotational postings with preferential conditions. Nobody is posted there "forever."

The problem is that we have no "free" airfields, and aircraft are tied to airfields. We have been forced to distribute the pilots and consolidate [uplotnyat] Air Force garrisons. Currently there is no other way out.

[Litovkin] What other difficulties is the Defense Ministry encountering with troop deployment and settling the families of officers and warrant officers? How are these problems being resolved and are they being resolved?

[Yazov] The main problem is housing. Although we will be able to wholly deploy soldiers and sergeants at existing barracks—admittedly, they will have to sleep in two separate stories and stand in two different lines at the mess hall, which is tolerable in principle—the situation with regard to apartments for the families of officers and warrant officers is very very complex.

You know that we currently have 173,600 people on the housing list, with more than 10,000 in Moscow alone. We have to take account of another 25,000 people coming from Hungary and Czechoslovakia without accommodation. The housing situation is the number one issue in all districts where we are withdrawing troops.

Using the Ministry's efforts and funds we annually build 60-70,000 apartments and, it would seem, we can wholly

meet our own needs for a few years. But, however paradoxical it may seem, this task is beyond us on our own.

The fact is that each year 70-75,000 officers, warrant officers, and extended-service volunteers are discharged each year upon retirement. Last year alone more than 110,000 men were discharged to the reserve in connection with the Army and Navy cuts. Some 85 percent of these continue to live on the territory of closed military garrisons. At the same time, 55,000 military college graduates and 40,000 warrant officers and ensigns—the overwhelming majority of whom are family men—are coming to start their service. Another 60,000 a year move around: Some are promoted, some enter an academy, some leave a region by rotation.... Until they receive housing at their new posting they retain their housing at their old posting.

What are we to do? Above all, we must instill the proper order with regard to the registration and distribution of housing—there are reserves in this area. We must obtain the 5 million square meters allocated to us on a proportional basis and owed to the military by local soviets. The main thing is to sharply increase the pace and volume of our own construction.

We have worked out a draft targeted social welfare program for servicemen and their family members, as well as for people discharged from active military service. It was presented for ratification by the USSR Council of Ministers back on 28 April. It contains a special section aimed at solving the housing problem. In the new five-year plan we aim to build 436,000 apartments with a total area of 24 million square meters for cadre servicemen—this is almost 25 percent more than in the current five-year plan. This figure includes 1.5 million square meters—or 25,000 apartments—for units withdrawn from the Central and Southern Groups of Forces.

These apartments will be built by USSR Defense Ministry military construction organizations—which will account for 19 million square meters—contract organizations from the Union republics, and construction ministries.

[Litovkin] All this is the future. What is being done today for the families of officers and warrant officers who are leaving the groups of forces?

[Yazov] Currently these families are housed in hostels, hotels, and housing allocated to them at the new garrisons. Moreover, a number of barracks, headquarter buildings, and training centers have been converted into hostels, and additional prefabricated hostels have been built. For instance, in the Moscow Military District alone there are five barracks with 300 places, while in the Belorussian Military District there are four barracks and two training centers with 320 places....

Is that a lot or not? According to our calculations, they can currently house 50 percent of the homeless families.

One family per room. Some 30 percent of officers and warrant officers will return to those places of service where they have reserved accommodation. The other 20 percent will have to rent apartments in the so-called private sector. This possibility exists. A recently adopted resolution set the compensation for renting housing at between R30 and 90 a month depending on which part of the country is involved.

Moreover, 17 apartment blocks housing 1,482 families will have been commissioned in the first quarter of this year. Four of them are in Sormovo, two are in Shuya, and three are in Zaslonoovo....

The Gosplan [State Planning Committee] has allocated us an additional R70 million, we have found reserves of another R30 million, and this year we will commission another 60 apartment blocks, 8 barracks, and 156 prefabricated hostels. I am confident that not a single family will be left without a roof over its head.

[Litovkin] Perhaps these difficulties you have mentioned could have been avoided if we had prepared in good time to withdraw our troops, rather than withdrawing on such a tight schedule. Or perhaps it was thought that our troops would be abroad forever?

[Yazov] That is a fair rebuke, but only partly fair. After all, even the status of our troops is defined under all intergovernmental agreements as "temporarily present on the territory" of the other country. I have already said that our defensive doctrine and the military reform forecasts had planned for our troops to be withdrawn from abroad and redeployed within the country.

We had been planning to withdraw our troops in connection with the half-million cut and in accordance with the expected accords in Vienna, but who would have thought that it would all happen so quickly? Revolutionary change cannot be foreseen or planned for. Although it did not catch us unawares.

We were able to persuade the Hungarian and Czechoslovak leaderships that it was physically impossible to withdraw the troops within a year. We are quietly doing this job on schedule. Not without difficulty, but without panic or fuss.

[Litovkin] One last question, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. How are military men cooperating with local republic, soviet, and party organs and the public in settling troops in new areas?

[Yazov] In different ways. In most regions we have complete mutual understanding. Particularly in Belorussia and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The people realize that it is not our own wish or desire to complicate the housing and social situation. I want to thank the people of Gorkiy and the Shuya city soviet for their great help. In Ivanovo Oblast, for instance, we were efficiently allocated a plot of land for construction and helped to set up a heating plant and to draw hot water from the plant's boilers. This October

two five-story apartment blocks of 70 apartments will be commissioned there for the families of officers returning from Czechoslovakia.

In Ivano-Frankovsk representatives of informal movements blocked our construction plans. They claimed that a five-story building would block out the sunlight for other buildings. It would do so even on the outskirts of town. It is shameful to hear such things.

The families of officers and warrant officers leaving the groups of forces with their units—like our entire Army—are not some caste of pariahs, they are our people and an inalienable part of society. We must be concerned about them together.

European Disarmament Forum Held

Forum Opens

LD0507204890 Moscow TASS in English 2021 GMT
5 Jul 90

[By correspondent Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Tallinn, July 5 (TASS)—The second stage of the ninth convent for European nuclear disarmament opened here today. It is attended by over 1,200 representatives of anti-war public organizations, scientists, journalists and parliamentarians from West and East Europe and other regions of the world.

Participants in the forum arrived in Tallinn after the first stage ended in the famous Finlandia Hall in Helsinki, the site of the conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975.

The convent was organized by the Finnish committee 100, Peace Committee, Union for Peace and the Green Union, which passed on the symbolic baton to the like-minded Estonian Popular Front, Peace Committee and Green Movement.

Opening a sitting at Tallinn's Sakala Centre, Chairman of the Estonian Peace Committee Arnold Gren read out greetings from the republican parliament, stressing that peace movement is the most important component of the current political life in Europe.

Speakers focused on manifestations of militarism in the current society and ways to fight its open and covert structures.

Estonian participants made speeches reflecting processes and feelings typical of the republic today. Writer Li Seppel said the "cult of the Soviet occupation army has led to the dangerous militarisation of the Estonian school system, which is alien to the Estonian people".

Estonian parliament deputy Marju Lauristin said due to "propaganda hysteria" and the alleged "menace to use force", a rally of Estonians who served in the German Army during World War II has been called off. She was referring to the rally of former servicemen of the 20th

Estonian SS Division and other formations, which was scheduled between July 7-8.

National Problems Emphasized

*LD0607215390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1618 GMT 6 Jul 90*

[Report by TASS correspondent Sergey Skeipnikov]

[Text] Tallinn, 6 July (TASS)—The participants in the international "European Nuclear Disarmament Movement" convention today, the second day of the convention's work in Tallinn, placed the emphasis on national problems. Moreover, representatives of Estonia's People's Front drew attention to the topic of that Baltic republic's self-determination.

Maryu Lauristin, a USSR Supreme Soviet member and her colleague Klara Hallik spoke at the plenary sitting and in one of the working groups and held a news conference. The theme of their speeches was "the occupation of little Estonia by the Soviet empire," the need for comprehensive opposition to Russian immigration, and "cultural ecology."

One of the participants in the news conference, Halef Salemi the director of an anti-racist center in Oslo, noted that people in Estonia talk more often about the rights of the majority today whereas in democratic countries, in Britain and France, for example, they talk primarily about guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities.

A lively interest was evoked among the participants by topics touched upon in the reports like integration in the West and disintegration in the countries of East Europe and the prospects for the emergence of political systems with complex ethnic structures similar to the USSR, India, and a united Europe.

Global Problems Discussed

*LD0707204790 Moscow TASS in English 2022 GMT
7 Jul 90*

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn, July 8 (TASS)—The ninth convent for nuclear disarmament ended here on Saturday. It began in Helsinki and ended in the Estonian capital. Representatives of 44 countries discussed at plenary meetings and 40 workshops problems dealing with the preservation of peace and the creation of a safe European home which, in their opinion, cannot be peaceful without universal peace.

The concluding day of the convent was devoted to global problems dealing with the preservation of peace, the elimination of vestiges of colonialism and so on.

Participants in the discussion exchanged views on a possibility of creating absolutely safe nuclear reactors and the ability of nuclear power plant to guarantee

ecologically safe energy generation. They expressed concern over the fact that practically any nuclear power plant can be used as a basis for producing stuffing for nuclear weapons. [sentence as received]

A final decision on the venue of the next convent will be made next september. Judging by results of an unofficial discussion, the overwhelming majority of organisers give preference to Moscow.

Steps Toward 'Military Detente' in Asia Viewed

*OW0707113290 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0600 GMT 7 Jul 90*

[Text] Ovchinnikov, a Soviet political commentator, told our reporter (Mihanev): There are more and more indications that dialogue such as that which has been taking place between the Soviet Union and the United States on Europe has spread from the Atlantic Ocean to the vast Pacific region.

He pointed out: The Soviet president's visit to the United States showed that our country pursues a [word indistinct] policy in all regions.

Ovchinnikov believed: Perhaps the most sensational episode during President Gorbachev's visit to the United States was his meeting with South Korean President No Tae-u in San Francisco. We may say that that meeting breached the fortress of cold war in Asia.

The Soviet political commentator said: We in Moscow welcome the forthcoming Pyongyang-Seoul meeting. We hope that the cause of the peaceful reunification of Korea will be pushed forward on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops from there.

On how to establish a new Asian security organization, he said: Gorbachev proposed at Krasnoyarsk two years ago that talks be held on easing tensions in the region bounded by the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. It is now time for us to remember this. The views expressed later by South Korean President No Tae-u conformed with Gorbachev's proposal to a great extent. No Tae-u proposed that Washington representatives should also participate in the talks. Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu expressed his willingness to join the discussion on easing tensions and enhancing trust.

The Soviet political commentator pointed out: In my view, Mongolia and Canada should be included in the discussions on security in the Asian-Pacific region so as to make the discussion more representative.

The Soviet political commentator described the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and the two countries' willingness to completely demilitarize their boundary, the longest land boundary in the world, as an important joint step to achieve military detente in the Asian-Pacific Region.

GDR's Meckel Supports Nuclear-Free Europe

PM0407135490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 26, 8-15 Jul 90 p 1

[Undated interview with GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel, by Vladimir Markov: "Markus Meckel: A Nuclear-Free Germany"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Berlin—The second meeting between the foreign ministers of the GDR, FRG, USSR, the United States, France and Great Britain has taken place in Berlin, on the "2 plus 4" formula. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Markus Meckel, replies to MOSCOW NEWS' questions.

[MN] During the Berlin meeting, you spoke in favour of Germany's future abstention not only from production, possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also from the deployment of such weapons on German soil. Would you please elaborate on this new element in your position?

[Meckel] Even today we must work to design and implement new pan-European security structures. Obviously, this new system of security must be independent of old doctrines that rely on nuclear weapons. You may say: nuclear means can be necessary in the future—for example, to protect navies. Perhaps that's true. However, nuclear means are clearly redundant in the centre of Europe. All nuclear powers must contribute to the creation of a nuclear-free Europe. Of course, I include in this number both the Soviet Union and NATO. In view of Germany's reunification, we mustn't delay any longer a complete revision of the current nuclear doctrines involving Europe.

[MN] What's your opinion about the recent Soviet proposals concerning the establishment of new relations between the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] and NATO?

[Meckel] We support these proposals and share the opinion that both the WTO and NATO need to jointly declare the new principles concerning their interrelations. In this connection, we propose a conference of high-placed representatives of the members of the two blocs even before the top-level meeting of state participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe scheduled for this November in Paris.

Nuclear Submarine Sale to India Criticized

PM0407140890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 26, 8-15 Jul 90 p 12

[Article by Aleksandr Mozgovoy: "Selling Nuclear Subs Abroad"]

[Text] According to The Sunday Observer, India is planning to acquire a second nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union. The first one, named "Chakra"—which

means "wheel" and symbolizes the eternity of life (incidentally, Chakra is depicted in the centre of the Indian national flag)—was leased to India in 1988.

At the time this event touched off a controversy abroad (but, as usual, this was hushed up in our country). "Chakra" belongs to the subclass of nuclear submarines equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles. These missiles can also carry nuclear warheads. True, Moscow said the submarine leased by India was not armed with nuclear missiles and was meant for training purposes only.

But the expediency of such lease is doubtful. Such a transfer of nuclear technologies for military purposes to other countries does not correspond if not to the letter, then to the spirit of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed by the USSR. India has refused to be part of this important agreement.

The nuclear arms race in South Asia has reached a dangerous pitch. Several years ago India tested a nuclear device. Pakistan, too, has an extensive nuclear programme. Both states are hard at work developing nuclear weapon carrier missiles.

"The risk of nuclear war today is greater than ever in the last decade, but not between the superpowers," says professor G. Milhollin of the University of Wisconsin. "There is a real chance of war in South Asia for Kashmir." Maybe, this is an exaggeration. But why add nuclear fuel to the fire of Indo-Pakistani disputes?

Supplying nuclear submarines to India also runs counter to the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The arms race in its basin is escalating as it is. The might of the Indian Navy has grown considerably. Today it is capable of operating on vast areas of the ocean. "At present the Indian Navy cannot create a threat to the navies of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean. But after ten years hence, if their number doubles, they will be capable of doing so," says Admiral J. Nadkarni, Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy. In his opinion, India, relying on its Navy, should turn into a major regional power capable of ousting an "extra-regional presence".

According to reports from India the second submarine will be sold rather than leased, lifting restrictions on its use in combat.

Perhaps from a commercial point of view, the sale of nuclear submarines is profitable. But restraint and extreme circumspection are needed in any arms deal. Particularly, if it concerns nuclear technologies. Their deliveries must be strictly banned. The USSR Supreme Soviet must raise serious objections to this.

**Gerasimov Calls GDR Chemical Weapons Report
'Hoax'**

*LD1107122290 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT
11 Jul 90*

[By TASS correspondents Leonid Timofeyev and Konstantin Voitsekhovich]

[Text] Moscow, July 11 (TASS)—A Soviet Foreign Ministry official today described as a "provocative hoax" a report in the West Berlin newspaper BERLINER MORGENPOST on Tuesday, quoting government sources, that the USSR has 20,000 to 30,000 tonnes of chemical weapons on East German territory.

Addressing a briefing here today, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov recalled that President Mikhail Gorbachev said in Prague on April 10, 1988 that the USSR had no chemical weapons beyond its borders.

The newspaper report was also refuted by East German Government officials.

Gerasimov expressed regret that the fabrication surfaced on the eve of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow.

**New Destroyer Off Norway To Join Northern
Fleet**

*PM1107145690 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
10 Jul 90 p 4*

[Report: "New Soviet Destroyer for the Northern Fleet"]

[Text] A newly built destroyer of the Sovremennyy class is moving north along the Norwegian coast, on its way to the Soviet Northern Fleet. The destroyer, which has been named the "Rastoropnyy," was yesterday off the coast of Troms. The ship is the Northern Fleet's seventh Sovremennyy class ship. The ship was built at the Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad. It is specially equipped for surface warfare, but also has an antisubmarine capability. The ship, which has a crew of around 320 men, has a top speed of 32 knots. It also has room for a helicopter on board.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO 24-Hour Air Defense System Modified*LD0407152190 Hamburg DPA in German 1446 GMT
4 Jul 90*

[Text] Bremervoerde (DPA)—NATO air defense has changed the shift duty of its antiaircraft missile units to a usual daytime and training duty pattern from 1 July. This was announced by Baron Bernd von Hoyer-Boot, commander of the antiaircraft missile command II, in Bremervoerde on 4 July. As a result of the changed political situation, the previous warning time has come down from 48 hours to possibly one week and justified the renunciation of "round the clock" duty.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**Dregger Welcomes Withdrawal of Nuclear Ammunition***LD0207154490 Hamburg DPA in German 1038 GMT
2 Jul 90*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Alfred Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union parliamentary group has welcomed the intention of U.S. President George Bush, to withdraw all nuclear shells [atomgranaten] from Europe. In a statement today Dregger referred to the fact that he has been calling for the abolition of nuclear artillery for a long time. It is not suitable as a deterrent and cannot therefore help to prevent war; its elimination is a further contribution to detente, he said. [passage omitted]

NETHERLANDS**India Protests Fokker F-16 Sales to Pakistan***90EN0681B Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD
in Dutch 1 Jun 90 p 3*

[Text] The Hague, 1 June—The Indian ambassador is putting pressure on the Netherlands Government to prevent the Netherlands from providing F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. These Fokker aircraft types supposedly can be used by the Pakistanis to deliver atomic bombs. According to a spokesman for the ambassador, India is "concerned" about Fokker's deliveries to Pakistan which "could increase tensions between the two countries."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that "there is no request to supply F-16 aircraft to Pakistan." There are reportedly indications that bomb runs are being simulated by Pakistan in the vicinity of the Kahuta Nuclear Research Center using the approximately 40 F-16's that had previously been supplied to Pakistan by Fokker. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, the F-16's that Pakistan already has are "not suited for nuclear missions."

Fokker reports that it has never made deliveries directly to Pakistan. "We always supply the F-16's to General Dynamics in the United States. They resell them." According to a public relations official, General Dynamics has ordered "five or six" jet fighters of the F-16 type from Fokker for delivery in 1992. Fokker knows that Pakistan is the contractor, but where the F-16's wind up and what will be done with them is not regarded by Fokker as its responsibility, according to the public relations official. "It is the same as if some one says: Drugs are being transported in South America in old F-27's. We have no opinion on that."

NORWAY**Holst Disarmament View Seen Missing Point***90EN0636A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
21 May 90 p 2*

[Article by John Berg, freelance journalist specializing in military affairs: "Dangerous Suggestion on Naval Disarmament"]

[Text] As disarmament negotiations progress, the technical military issues of force structure and operation strategies become more urgent. Though not for former Defense Minister Johan Joergen Holst. His article "Time for Arms Control on the Seas," 11 May, is most interesting for the issues he does not bring up.

Holst's statement that "attention should be paid to the Soviet Union and NATO's unequal dependence upon the sea lanes, especially those which connect the United States with its allies," is as unproductive as saying that "attention must be paid to the possibility that the environment may be affected by pollution in the future." The fact is that while the open seas are of marginal importance for the Soviet Union, Norway's dependence upon the sea is basic. It is not "inequality," but a critical difference in peacetime as well as in times of crisis and war. Holst wishes to negotiate our most vital security needs without the Soviet Union having to put correspondingly vital interests into the balance. Because he does not see the dimensions, he does not see the relationships either.

Holst thinks that a reduction in the number of attack submarines on both sides will provide additional security on the seas. As is his habit, he overlooks both the fundamental differences in the roles played by submarines in the East and West and the interdependence of submarine and surface vessel operations. A reduction in the number of Western submarines results in the reduction of operational options open to NATO's surface groups, because the groups are dependent upon their own submarines for their self-defense against Soviet submarines. Most recently, the war in the Falklands showed us what enormous self-defense resources such groups need, even where there is a mere suspicion of enemy submarines in the vicinity. Moreover, NATO's submarines will have reduced options for independent

operations against Soviet submarines. The ocean does not get smaller because the number of attack submarines is reduced.

Supply Lines

Soviet submarines, on the other hand, will have a much easier task of choosing the time and place for an attack on NATO's supply lines. Reductions in NATO's capabilities can lead us into a situation which resembles the period 1939-43, when a small number of German submarines could harry allied convoys almost at will.

The point is, when Western capability is reduced, a decreased number of Soviet attack submarines acquires greatly increased significance. Furthermore, because of new Soviet submarine technology, western concepts of anti-submarine warfare are due for the most thorough reassessment in decades. The key to maintaining balance on the seas is knowing how many surface vessels, aircraft, helicopters, and submarines NATO must deploy in order to safeguard a group of supply ships against a single modern Soviet attack submarine. Holst wishes to negotiate without bringing this balance into focus and before we know the contours of those resources that will be required for securing supply lines in the next century.

Defense Minister on East-West Security

Defends NATO Role

PM0307083790 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
28 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Defense Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen:
"NATO Still of Central Importance"]

[Text] At the end of the Storting's spring session it might be as well to take a look back over the major international political and military changes that have taken place since last fall. The time has now come to consider what conclusions we in Norway should draw from them.

Norway has been affected only to a small extent by the military changes in Eastern Europe. However, in the long term the growth of a new political order in Europe will be of crucial importance for us. It is naturally in Norway's interest that we help shape Europe in the direction we deem desirable. In practice, this means that we in Norway—while as we wholeheartedly support the democratization process in Eastern Europe—should not jettison the security arrangements that throughout the postwar period have provided us with the security we enjoy today.

For the foreseeable future, NATO will continue to be the central instrument for protecting Western security interests. No other organization has anything like NATO's integrated political and military cooperation. NATO is the only organization that links militarily the defense of Europe to North America and thereby maintains the common security of the transatlantic community. The transatlantic link is of crucial importance to Norway as a

strategically exposed flank nation with modest national military resources. One of our main objectives in the security field must therefore be the preservation of the fundamental NATO principle: An attack on one alliance member is an attack on the whole alliance, and security is therefore indivisible.

We in Norway should also attach great importance to guaranteeing close and extensive cooperation within the alliance, particularly in the field of military planning. As transnational organizations such as the EC and CSCE assume an ever greater part of the purely political elements in East-West relations, a central task will be to prevent the military side of Western defense cooperation from being weakened. Such a weakening would have serious negative consequences for NATO's ability to provide the security guarantee that is the main objective of the alliance and could impair NATO's ability to exert a real influence on political developments.

A weakening of NATO's military functions could also lead to an unfortunate and extremely dubious "renationalization" of European defense systems. At worst, this could lead to new antagonisms and even new arms races—something the young democracies in Eastern Europe in particular would not be served by.

The successful conclusion of the CFE negotiations in Vienna on conventional forces in Europe will result in a treaty producing the most comprehensive arms reductions ever carried out. It will therefore have a profound effect on the military situation in Europe and on Norway's situation. Among the most difficult problems in the negotiations is the control of attack aircraft. The Soviet Union's current proposal will exempt important sections of its air forces from inclusion in the treaty. This is unacceptable to NATO.

It is also of concern that the Soviet Union presently is transferring more attack aircraft, even those with nuclear potential, to the Navy's air arm. One of the aims of such steps is to keep them out of treaties: Sea-based naval forces are not covered by the CFE negotiations, and the Soviet Union is now proposing that land-based naval forces also be excluded. Given our location close to important Soviet bases, this question is of particular importance to Norway. The government therefore attaches great importance to ensuring that a CFE agreement also includes land-based naval aircraft.

With the meeting between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in late May/early June, the foundation seems to have been laid for an epoch-making agreement on strategic nuclear arms reductions (START). From the Norwegian viewpoint, it is particularly important that the two sides have reached agreement on a ceiling for the number of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles with land targets (SLCMs). It is also pleasing that the two sides have agreed in principle on more comprehensive reductions once a START agreement has been signed.

It is both positive and encouraging to be able to note that NATO has both the flexibility and the adaptability to absorb the ongoing changes in its military and political environs. An important step in this connection was taken at the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in May. In light of the changes to the threat scenario, the committee decided to launch a new review of the alliance's military strategy. For example, a future regrouping of allied forces with greater emphasis on mobile units is envisaged. In addition, the retention of new multinational land-based forces is among measures currently under review.

The decision to suspend the planned—and partly begun—modernization of NATO's land-based tactical nuclear arms and the accelerated timetable for the start of negotiations on tactical missile systems are other concrete changes that have been made. The NATO summit in early July will look at the future role of nuclear arms, for example, and the application of the basic principles of forward defenses and flexible response in a situation that has changed radically.

NATO must have a realistic approach to the processes taking place outside the alliance in the security field. As is well known, we in Norway attach great importance to the work of the CSCE. That is why it is pleasing that also in NATO there is now agreement in support of an institutionalization of the work of the CSCE. Here we have a forum in which East and West, including both superpowers, meet and which could therefore play a central role in shaping a new security order in Europe.

At the same time, it is important to be aware of the obvious limitations of the CSCE: The CSCE alone will not be able to act as guarantor of the security of individual states, because the CSCE, even in the longer term, is hardly likely to acquire the machinery and the type of decisionmaking process that such a guarantee presupposes. In the future too only NATO will be able to satisfy our fundamental security needs.

Argues Against Defense Cuts

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29 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Defense Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen: "The Soviet Union Has Military Superiority in Europe"]

[Text] The improvement in East-West relations, the prospect of agreements soon on reductions in both strategic and conventional forces, and the political changes in East Europe are all factors that benefit Norway's position. They give rise to the hope that in the longer term we will be able to satisfy our security needs with fewer resources than today. A realistic assessment of the conditions affecting security policy, however, requires that *all* relevant factors, including the less obvious and the less positive, be brought into the picture.

While the potential threat to Western Europe has diminished in a fairly short time, and for political and military

reasons the possibility of an attack is thought to be greatly reduced, military developments in the Soviet Union are far from unambiguous. Soviet combat forces in *our* immediate environs have been affected by unilateral Eastern force reductions only to a modest extent. As a result of a wide-ranging process of modernization, there is an ongoing improvement of military capacity in the naval branch of combat forces in the north. Concrete steps that are of particular significance for Norway are the announced addition of the Soviet Union's first real aircraft carriers to the Northern Fleet; the permanent stationing on the Kola Peninsula of long-range Backfire bombers, which can deliver both conventional and nuclear bombs and missiles; and the recent transfer to the Kola Peninsula of long-range "Flogger" fighter bombers, which have the potential to carry nuclear arms.

Even with a reduction in Soviet military capacity as a result of the very difficult economic situation in which the country finds itself, it is clear that for the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will be by far the strongest military power in Europe. Such a state will have considerable subjective and objective security requirements which are not necessarily linked to expansionist plans, but to which neighboring states—such as Norway—must nevertheless respond.

A consequence of our NATO membership is the concept of more-or-less minimum defenses on which we in Norway have based our military peacetime structure. Aside from measures determined by the amount of strategic warning we assume we will have (for mobilization), there are few aspects of Norwegian military personnel dispositions that can be said to be directly proportionate to the level of Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula. On the other hand, it is possible to point to a large number of measures designed to build up defenses through mobilization and to make it possible to receive allied support in crisis or war.

Our dispositions in peacetime must therefore primarily be seen in the context of what we consider will be demanded of us *and our allies* in the event of our facing a threat to or an attack on Norway or West Europe as a whole. In light of this, the central criterion in the context of readiness—both for us and for our allies—is an assessment of the Soviet threat as a function of the Soviet Union's capability and intentions *toward NATO as a strategic unit*.

Within the alliance, there is agreement not only on a fair division of the defense burden, but also on a fair division of the fruits. One of the fruits today is the weakened threat scenario in Europe. In the longer term, Norway ought to be able to reap the benefits, including the economic benefits, of this situation. A complicating factor for us, however, is that there is little to cut in our peacetime organization if in crisis or in war the defense forces are to be able to receive allied support and assert sovereignty over the *whole* of our territory. Our elongated territory, particularly at sea, and our geographical location remain unchanged by political developments.

The question that remains is: What areas can we make cuts without concurrently weakening our ability to strengthen and prepare defenses against a possible attack? These are tasks that cannot be carried out through improvisation, even with the possibility of a longer period of warning. Also, our proximity to the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula means the expected warning time in the north will not grow as much as in central Europe.

It is of particular importance that we avoid cuts in areas connected with our capacity to receive allied reinforcements. It must also be a prime objective that we avoid cuts in fields that weaken Norwegian—and consequently allied—combat capacity in war to such an extent that shortcomings become difficult to repair even with increased warning. Continued regular allied exercises in Norway are necessary if forces that could be transferred here in a crisis are to be in a position to provide effective support. Continued exercises are therefore necessary for the credibility of NATO's principles of reinforcement and solidarity.

In my view, there are very narrow limits to how far Norwegian peacetime defenses can be cut without this requiring a revision of our concept of a balanced national defense.

A possible alternative defense model based on a greater degree of allied specialization and division of labor even in our region could have the side effect of binding Norway closer to the other parts of allied defenses. However, the chances seem small that other countries in the alliance would take on greater commitments under the present conditions. There are also clear fundamental reservations about becoming overdependent on help and reinforcements from others.

Possible defense cuts as a result of a reduction in budgetary allocations will in any case have to be undertaken in fields where allied forces are in a position to maintain defense capacity at a level that is realistically proportionate to the assumed risk. However, it is an illusion to believe that it is possible to carry out significant reductions without this having repercussions on defense capacity. Resurrecting defense capacity once it has been run down would be a task requiring great resources and much time. Possible future reductions in defense efforts can only take place on the basis of *lasting and guaranteed* changes in military strength levels and in the political circumstances that affect our security. The assessments and recommendations at which the 1990 Defense Commission will arrive will therefore have to be of central importance when it comes to the important and difficult decisions that will have to be made on the structure of our defenses in the years to come.

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